Dialogue on the Iranian Nuclear Program: Lessons Learned and Ignored (1992–2020)

This chapter analyses the phases of the U.S.–Russia dialogue on Iran’s nuclear deal, results of the bilateral cooperation in each period and lessons that can be drawn. The author traces the roots of U.S.–Russia disagreement on the issue, pointing out that general perception of Iran and current economic ties with the country influence their stances on its nuclear aspirations. The first phase (1992–2000) was marked by coordination rather than cooperation and resulted in some compromises: the U.S. agreed upon Russia’s construction of the Bushehr NPP in exchange for Russia’s pledge to stop military trade with Iran, yet the U.S. imposed sanctions against some Russian export entities. In the second stage (2001–2010) Moscow and Washington cooperated on tailoring the UN sanctions against Iran amid its nuclear buildup. Though Russia was ready to take a softer stance, the U.S. and Iran leaders never managed to find a common ground. The greatest achievement of the third phase of the U.S.–Russia dialogue (2011–2016) was the JCPOA, which came despite tensions between the two countries on other issues. But the dialogue stalled in the fourth stage (2017–2020), when Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the nuclear deal and restored sanctions against Iran. The author concludes that Russia may be a valuable asset for restoring U.S. diplomacy with Iran under the new administration.