Truth and Reality in Whitehead’s Metaphysics

Glen Veitch challenges the notion of a determinate, singular reality within Whitehead’s philosophy. In order to achieve this, he sets out first to establish a doctrine of “panexperientialism” as an integral and necessary part of the philosophy of organism. Veitch then argues that there is an undervalued principle of perspectivism inherent in Whitehead’s metaphysics that has scarcely been discussed. Integrating panexperientialism with perspectivism, Veitch turns to the notion of truth and argues that for the philosophy of organism in particular, and process ontologies more generally, the concept of “truth” is more amenable to coherence models rather than correspondence models. He predicates this claim on Whitehead’s “reformed subjectivist principle” and its relation to other foundational notions such as the “principle of process,” the “ontological principle” and the “principle of relativity.”