The jāti in the Mādhyamika – Different Approaches between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti

Kajiyama has argued that the basis for the concept of jāti (false rejoinder) as described in the Nyāyasūtra is the concept xiang ying (相応) as found in the Fangbian xin lun (方便心論). Kajiyama has also shown that the sophistic arguments called xiang ying are very similar to the prasaṅga arguments of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school. It thus seems worthwhile to investigate how later Mādhyamika philosophers treated the concept of jāti that originally appeared as the result of the Nyāyasūtra’s criticism of the concept xiang ying and was later accepted by Buddhist logicians such as Dignāga. This paper shows that there were two entirely opposite Mādhyamika positions regarding the concept of jāti. In order to demonstrate this difference, this paper examines in detail statements about jātis that appear in various treatises, especially two works by Bhāviveka and three works by Candrakīrti. As the result, it becomes clear that the differences in the two positions correspond essentially to the differences in how Dignāgaʼs logic was evaluated by the so-called Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika within the Madhyamaka school.