Journal of Development Economics, volume 162, pages 103072
Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem
M. Mehrab Bakhtiar
1
,
Raymond P. Guiteras
2
,
James Levinsohn
3
,
Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
3, 4
1
International Food Policy Research Institute, House 10A, Road 35, Gulshan 2, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh
|
Publication type: Journal Article
Publication date: 2023-05-01
Journal:
Journal of Development Economics
scimago Q1
SJR: 3.737
CiteScore: 8.3
Impact factor: 5.1
ISSN: 03043878, 18726089
Economics and Econometrics
Development
Abstract
Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person’s sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the group, or asked each group member to make a private or public pledge to maintain a hygienic latrine. The group financial reward has the strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5–12.5 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership, but this effect dissipates in the medium term (15 months). In contrast, the public commitment induced a 4.2–6.3 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term, but this effect persists in the medium term. Non-financial social recognition or a private pledge has no detectable effect on sanitation investments.
Are you a researcher?
Create a profile to get free access to personal recommendations for colleagues and new articles.