Journal of Development Economics, volume 162, pages 103072

Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem

M. Mehrab Bakhtiar 1
Raymond P. Guiteras 2
James Levinsohn 3
Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak 3, 4
Publication typeJournal Article
Publication date2023-05-01
scimago Q1
SJR3.737
CiteScore8.3
Impact factor5.1
ISSN03043878, 18726089
Economics and Econometrics
Development
Abstract
Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person’s sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the group, or asked each group member to make a private or public pledge to maintain a hygienic latrine. The group financial reward has the strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5–12.5 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership, but this effect dissipates in the medium term (15 months). In contrast, the public commitment induced a 4.2–6.3 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term, but this effect persists in the medium term. Non-financial social recognition or a private pledge has no detectable effect on sanitation investments.

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