Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit

Chan B.

Anderson R.A., Nichols S., Pizarro D.A.

In six studies, we examined two foundational questions about moral praise. First, what makes an action praiseworthy? In Study 1, participants reported that actions that exceed duties (compared with dutiful actions) deserve greater praise and are perceived as less likely to happen. Second, what do observers infer from praise? Praise may communicate information about local norms. In Study 2, we found that—in general—participants expect praise to increase the likelihood of a behavior. However, in Studies 3–6, participants inferred that moral behavior that receives praise is less common and is less required and expected of people. These inferences led individuals to judge that someone would be less likely to perform a behavior that was praised. These studies provide insight into the lay beliefs and communicative function of moral praise.

Kirby N.

Abstract This chapter offers a novel solution to the problem of the basis of basic equality. It begins with the assumption that, in virtue of possessing some degree of rational agency as a non-normative property, (almost) all human beings are able to be morally responsible for their actions to some degree of credit. However, it is a mistake to equate such degrees of credit with the moral worth of one’s actions. Moral worth is equivalent to the actual value of such credit attained (‘choice’) relative to the possible values of credit available to that individual (‘circumstance’). Once differences in circumstance, including any initial differences in our degrees of rational agency, are accounted for, then it follows that each individual has the equal ability to attain moral worth, regardless of any initial differences in such rational agency. We are equals, at least, in this one moral property. Why should we accept such claims about moral worth to be true? They are the most plausible way to avoid the problem of circumstantial moral luck. What, if anything, follows given such basic equality? Each individual’s response to the challenge of attaining moral worth should have, ceteris paribus, ‘equal weight’ in the world implying the equalization of circumstances.

van Loon M.

AbstractAccording to a popular view, excuses undermine blameworthiness. At the same time, philosophers commonly accept that blameworthiness is composed of two necessary conditions: a moral objectionability condition and a responsibility condition. For excuses to do their job, they must undermine at least one of these conditions. In this paper, I conclude that excuses do neither. By inference to the best explanation, I propose a view that reconciles this conclusion with the function of excuses.

Rozeboom G.J.

When do companies deserve moral credit for doing what is right? This question concerns the positive side of corporate moral responsibility, the negative side of which is the more commonly discussed issue of when companies are blameworthy for doing what is wrong. I offer a broadly functionalist account of how companies can act from morally creditworthy motives, which defuses the following Strawsonian challenge to the claim that they can: morally creditworthy motivation involves being guided by attitudes of “goodwill” for others, and these attitudes involve affect and/or phenomenal consciousness, which corporate agents cannot maintain. In response, I show that what matters about being guided by attitudes of goodwill is being directly concerned for others in one’s practical deliberation. Companies can achieve this direct concern through their decision-making procedures without affect or phenomenal consciousness. I also explore how a company’s moral creditworthiness, or lack thereof, should shape stakeholders’ relationship with it.

Grant J.

According to some, when you do the right thing, your moral beliefs make no difference to your act’s moral worth. Huckleberry Finn believes he is doing something wrong in helping Jim escape slavery. Yet his act reflects well on him. Some conclude that acting rightly reflects just as well on you whether you believe you are doing something right, wrong, supererogatory, or neutral. I argue against this. Doing the right thing with certain moral beliefs can diminish the moral worth of doing it. In such cases, you do the right thing in the wrong spirit.

Telech D.

Haji I.

Blameworthiness semicompatibilism is the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral blameworthiness even if incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. Two concerns with this thesis are raised. First, I show why Frankfurt examples, which play a key role in underwriting blameworthiness semicompatibilism, are not as secure as many believe because of conceptual ties between blameworthiness and impermissibility. Second, I argue that if blameworthiness is conceptually associated, even if in a roundabout way with impermissibility, and one cannot do wrong unless one could have done otherwise, blameworthiness semicompatibilism is imperiled. With suitable amendments, parallel problems plague praiseworthiness semicompatibilism, the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral praiseworthiness even if incompatible with freedom to do otherwise.