Cambridge Journal of Economics

Hayek and Schmitt on the ‘depoliticization’ of the economy

Daniel Nientiedt
Publication typeJournal Article
Publication date2025-01-09
scimago Q2
wos Q2
SJR0.953
CiteScore4.3
Impact factor2
ISSN0309166X, 14643545
Abstract

Both Friedrich Hayek and Carl Schmitt criticize the role played by economic interest groups in modern democracies. This paper points out that their descriptions of how such groups attempt to obtain favourable treatment from the state (‘rent seeking’) are highly similar. The paper then discusses their proposed solutions. Schmitt’s solution, referred to as ‘depoliticization’, involves the establishment of an authoritarian state together with a corporatist economic system. Hayek, by contrast, argues in favour of constitutionally limiting the ability of politicians to grant privileges to economic groups. The paper further asks whether, as claimed in the literature, Hayek’s solution is similar to Schmitt’s in that both attempt to shield the free market economy from democratic oversight. It is reasoned that Hayek’s solution is not undemocratic (unless one defines democracy as pure majoritarianism), while Schmitt’s solution is not conducive to free markets.

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