Finitude and the Good Will

According to Kant, both finite (human) and non‐finite (divine) wills are subject to the moral law, though the manner of their subjection differs. The fact that the law expresses an ‘ought’ for the human will is a function of our imperfection. On this picture, a non‐finite will thus enjoys a certain explanatory priority vis‐à‐vis its finite counterpart: we can understand the practical constraint that binds the latter by seeing how contingent limitations differentiate it from the former. However, a reading of Kant's principle of autonomy that inextricably ties the achievement of willing to the adoption of a practical standpoint, gives us reasons for doubting this order of explanation. It suggests instead that we might best understand the practical ‘ought’ by taking the human will as explanatorily primitive. And if we do so, we can question the coherence of taking a will for which the law is not normative to furnish a paradigmatic exemplification of the relation that lies at the heart of Kant's notion of autonomy: namely, the relation between free volition and moral necessity.