How large is the output cost of disinflation?

Tamborini R.

Bianchi F., Ludvigson S.C., Ma S.

This paper combines a data-rich environment with a machine learning algorithm to provide new estimates of time-varying systematic expectational errors (“belief distortions”) embedded in survey responses. We find sizable distortions even for professional forecasters, with all respondent-types overweighting the implicit judgmental component of their forecasts relative to what can be learned from publicly available information. Forecasts of inflation and GDP growth oscillate between optimism and pessimism by large margins, with belief distortions evolving dynamically in response to cyclical shocks. The results suggest that artificial intelligence algorithms can be productively deployed to correct errors in human judgment and improve predictive accuracy. (JEL C45, D83, E23, E27, E31, E32, E37)

Bolhuis M., Cramer J.N., Summers L.

Magkonis G., Zekente K.

This study analyses the determinants of the sacrifice ratio; i.e., the output cost of disinflation. The empirical literature so far has used several model specifications, indicating the degree of model uncertainty. Even for those factors where consensus on their significance has been reached, such as trade openness and central bank independence, considerable uncertainty still surrounds their estimated sign. Motivated by the above, we estimate the most important drivers of the sacrifice ratio based on Bayesian model averaging, for a panel data set of 42 countries. Our findings confirm part of the evidence reported in the prior empirical literature, while it sheds light on the importance of other factors.

Gabaix X.

This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents’ partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded “cognitive discounting” parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is “ neo-Fisherian” in the long run, Keynesian in the short run. (JEL E12, E31, E43, E52, E62, E70)

Woodford M.

It is common to analyze the effects of alternative monetary policy commitments under the assumption of fully model-consistent expectations. This implicitly assumes unrealistic cognitive abilities on the part of economic decision makers. The relevant question, however, is not whether the assumption can be literally correct, but how much it would matter to model decision making in a more realistic way. A model is proposed, based on the architecture of artificial intelligence programs for problems such as chess or go, in which decision makers look ahead only a finite distance into the future, and use a value function learned from experience to evaluate situations that may be reached after a finite sequence of actions by themselves and others. Conditions are discussed under which the predictions of a model with finite-horizon forward planning are similar to those of a rational expectations equilibrium, and under which they are instead quite different. The model is used to re-examine the consequences that should be expected from a central-bank commitment to maintain a fixed nominal interest rate for a substantial period of time. Neo-Fisherian predictions are shown to depend on using rational expectations equilibrium analysis under circumstances in which it should be expected to be unreliable.

Katayama H., Ponomareva N., Sharma M.

Existing empirical studies on the sacrifice ratio (measuring the output cost of disinflation) consider a large number of potential explanatory variables including the length of disinflation, various institutional settings, economic conditions, and the political climate. Some results are robust across different studies, while others are not. We address the presence of model uncertainty by using the Bayesian model averaging method to identify the important determinants of the sacrifice ratio, without relying on ad hoc model selection. Our results show that the length of disinflation is the most important variable. This supports the ‘cold turkey’ argument for faster disinflation.

Nakamura E., Steinsson J., Sun P., Villar D.

A key policy question is: how high an inflation rate should central banks target? This depends crucially on the costs of inflation. An important concern is that high inflation will lead to inefficient price dispersion. Workhorse New Keynesian models imply that this cost of inflation is very large. An increase in steady-state inflation from 0% to 10% yields a welfare loss that is an order of magnitude greater than the welfare loss from business cycle fluctuations in output in these models. We assess this prediction empirically using a new data set on price behavior during the Great Inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s in the United States. If price dispersion increases rapidly with inflation, we should see the absolute size of price changes increasing with inflation: price changes should become larger as prices drift further from their optimal level at higher inflation rates. We find no evidence that the absolute size of price changes rose during the Great Inflation. This suggests that the standard New Keynesian analysis of the welfare costs of inflation is wrong and its implications for the optimal inflation rate need to be reassessed. We also find that (nonsale) prices have not become more flexible over the past 40 years.

Gibbs C.G., Kulish M.

We study disinflations under imperfect credibility of the central bank. We propose a framework to model imperfectly credible announcements and use it to study the distribution of the output cost for a given disinflation. Imperfect credibility is modeled as the extent to which agents rely on adaptive learning to form expectations. Lower credibility increases the mean, variance, and skewness of the distribution of the sacrifice ratio. When credibility is low, disinflations become very costly for adverse realizations of the shocks. But, an opportunistic disinflation, a disinflation implemented after a period of below trend inflation, can significantly lower the sacrifice ratio. With simulated data, we reinterpret the reduced form evidence in sacrifice ratio regressions. Coefficient estimates from these regressions can be misleading for policymakers considering the cost of disinflation.

Bordo M., Erceg C., Levin A., Michaels R.

This paper examines how central bank credibility affects the merits of a “gradualist” versus “cold turkey” approach to disinflation in a DSGE model in which private agents use optimal filtering to infer the central bank’s nominal anchor. Our analysis is applied to two episodes of sharp and deliberate monetary tightening in the United States – the post-WWI deflation and the Volcker disinflation. For a policy regime with relatively high credibility, our analysis highlights the benefits of a gradualist approach; thus, the aggressive tightening that occurred in 1920–21 did not seem warranted. In contrast, for a policy regime with relatively low credibility (such as the Federal Reserve in late 1980), an aggressive policy stance can play an important signalling role by making the policy shift more evident to private agents.

Davis J.S.

Watson M.W.

The rate of inflation fell far less over the period 2007-2013 than in the period 1979-1985 despite similar large increases in the unemployment rate. This paper asks why. Possible explanations include a change in the persistence of inflation, changes in NAIRU, and other shocks. A change in the persistence of inflation, with inflation more anchored in the period 2007-2013 than in the period 1979-1985, is found to be important. The level and change in the NAIRU cannot be precisely estimated, but the data suggest an increase of nearly 1 percentage point since 2007.

Reifschneider D., Laubach T., Brayton F.

The FRB/US model of the U.S. economy is one of several that Federal Reserve Board staff consults for forecasting and the analysis of macroeconomic issues, including both monetary and fiscal policy.

Bowdler C., Nunziata L.

Using OECD panel data for 1961–2000 we provide evidence that the output cost associated with disinflation (the sacrifice ratio) decreases with coordination between wage-setters in the labor market. The relationship holds for alternative measures of labor market coordination and after controlling for standard sacrifice ratio determinants. The sign of the relationship is robust across alternative definitions of the sacrifice ratio, but its statistical significance varies. Our results also indicate that more stringent employment protection laws increase sacrifice ratios, but the effect is not significant at conventional levels. We provide explanations for our findings based on the speed of nominal wage adjustment in New Keynesian models.

Gagnon E.

This paper provides new insight into the relationship between inflation and the setting of individual prices by examining a large data set of Mexican consumer prices covering episodes of both low and high inflation. When the annual rate of inflation is low (below 10%–15%), the frequency of price changes comoves weakly with inflation because movements in the frequency of price decreases and increases partly offset each other. In contrast, the average magnitude of price changes correlates strongly with inflation because it is sensitive to movements in the relative shares of price increases and decreases. When inflation rises beyond 10%–15%, few price decreases are observed and both the frequency and average magnitude are important determinants of inflation. I show that a menu-cost model with idiosyncratic technology shocks predicts the average frequency and magnitude of price changes well over a range of inflation similar to that experienced by Mexico.