A Modest Conception of Moral Right & Wrong

ABSTRACT

Taking inspiration from Hume, I advance a conception of the part of morality concerned with right and wrong, rooted in the actual moral rules established and followed within our society. Elsewhere, I have argued this approach provides a way of thinking about how we are genuinely “bound in a moral way” to keep our moral obligations that it is both ethically attractive and psychologically realistic. Here, I focus on some implications for our evaluation and criticism of actions, which some may initially find peculiar. Sometimes we should judge of an action that it was (unqualifiedly) right, and the result of flawless reasoning by the agent; and yet, we may also have cause to regard that same action as, in other respects, deeply morally deficient. Using Nomy Arpaly's conception of “responsiveness to right‐making moral reasons” as a foil, I argue that this unorthodox implication leads to more subtle and helpful evaluations of actions—especially actions undertaken in the context of wicked social institutions. The conception also encourages us to take a more conflicted, less confident, attitude toward many of our own righteous and rational actions—and perhaps even toward our capacity for living together by moral rules itself.