volume 107 issue 3 pages 685-696

Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior

Publication typeJournal Article
Publication date2025-05-01
scimago Q1
wos Q1
SJR7.425
CiteScore8.3
Impact factor6.8
ISSN00346535, 15309142
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Abstract

I leverage a new panel on the contributions to members of the U.S. Congress (MCs) from 401,557 corporate leaders of 14,807 U.S. corporations over 1999–2018 to show that U.S. corporate elites use contributions to political campaigns as a tool of political influence. Donations increase by 11% when a politician is assigned to a committee dealing with policy issues relevant to a corporate leader’s company. The effect is driven by donations to MCs with the greatest power in the committees. I estimate that, absent an influence motive, donations from corporate leaders during this period would have been lower by $20 million.

Found 
Found 

Top-30

Journals

1
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
1 publication, 16.67%
SSRN Electronic Journal
1 publication, 16.67%
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
1 publication, 16.67%
Economics and Politics
1 publication, 16.67%
Legislative Studies Quarterly
1 publication, 16.67%
American Political Science Review
1 publication, 16.67%
1

Publishers

1
2
Cambridge University Press
2 publications, 33.33%
Wiley
2 publications, 33.33%
Social Science Electronic Publishing
1 publication, 16.67%
American Economic Association
1 publication, 16.67%
1
2
  • We do not take into account publications without a DOI.
  • Statistics recalculated weekly.

Are you a researcher?

Create a profile to get free access to personal recommendations for colleagues and new articles.
Metrics
6
Share
Cite this
GOST |
Cite this
GOST Copy
Teso E. Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior // Review of Economics and Statistics. 2025. Vol. 107. No. 3. pp. 685-696.
GOST all authors (up to 50) Copy
Teso E. Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior // Review of Economics and Statistics. 2025. Vol. 107. No. 3. pp. 685-696.
RIS |
Cite this
RIS Copy
TY - JOUR
DO - 10.1162/rest_a_01321
UR - https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01321/115276/Influence-Seeking-in-U-S-Corporate-Elites-Campaign
TI - Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior
T2 - Review of Economics and Statistics
AU - Teso, Edoardo
PY - 2025
DA - 2025/05/01
PB - MIT Press
SP - 685-696
IS - 3
VL - 107
SN - 0034-6535
SN - 1530-9142
ER -
BibTex |
Cite this
BibTex (up to 50 authors) Copy
@article{2025_Teso,
author = {Edoardo Teso},
title = {Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2025},
volume = {107},
publisher = {MIT Press},
month = {may},
url = {https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01321/115276/Influence-Seeking-in-U-S-Corporate-Elites-Campaign},
number = {3},
pages = {685--696},
doi = {10.1162/rest_a_01321}
}
MLA
Cite this
MLA Copy
Teso, Edoardo, et al. “Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior.” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 107, no. 3, May. 2025, pp. 685-696. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01321/115276/Influence-Seeking-in-U-S-Corporate-Elites-Campaign.