Sandfontein: An Operational Re-examination of the Battle, Contextualised within General J.C. Smuts’ First Phase of the German South West African Campaign 1914

The battle of Sandfontein November 26, 1914 marked the fledgeling Union Defence Force’s first defeat. Historians have used this long-forgotten battle as a lens to view the divisive political and military aspects of the Union’s early history. Unfortunately, some of their scholarship has passed through a distorted lens. Official histories were the first to obfuscate military and leadership shortcomings and interfere with the operational context surrounding Sandfontein. Theirs was for political reasons—a mission to protect delicate reputations and mollify a divided population. Historians have erroneously assumed that General J.C. Smuts’ initial plan for the invasion of German South West Africa 1914 was modified to exclude Walvis Bay/Swakopmund’s occupation. Instead, delays in occupying Walvis Bay/Swakopmund placed the UDF’s forces at Lüderitzbucht in a precarious position. Sandfontein, a desperate attempt to distract the Schutztruppe, was an operational failure, rather than the tactical faux pas portrayed by historians.