The Problem with Authoritarian Populists

We assume that even though voters prefer the policies of their favoured leader they value democracy more greatly. This means that voters on both sides of a polarised policy divide would be willing to sacrifice their preferred policy if it would mean preserving democracy. However voters on one side are unsure whether voters on the other side share this commitment to democracy. We show that in such a situation an autocratic populist leader can act in ways that will undermine opposing voters beliefs that the leader’s supporters continue to value democracy. If these beliefs become pessimistic enough, a self-reinforcing cycle of mutual suspicion between voters on opposing sides leads to the inexorable demise of democracy and its replacement by autocratic rule. Understanding this, an elected leader who aspires to rule via non-democratic means may follow such autocratic populist policies in order to entrench their rule.

JEL Classifications: D72, P16, P17, P48