Triebfeder, Zurechenbarkeit und empirische Psychologie: C. C. E. Schmids Handlungstheorie im Ausgang von Kant

C. C. E. Schmid began his academic career as a Kantian and became an influential commentator on Kant’s works. In the course of his career, however, he devoted himself increasingly to the philosophical treatment of empirical topics. Schmid’s turn towards the empirical is evident in his Attempt at a Moral Philosophy and is further developed in his Empirical Psychology and Physiology, Treated Philosophically. This paper examines Schmid’s change of perspective by focusing on his concept of moral imputability. It argues that while Schmid adheres to Kant’s terminology, he interprets the terms “incentive” (Triebfeder) and “moral feeling” differently from Kant. Schmid locates the concepts of incentive and moral feeling in the realm of sensibility, which has significant implications for his concept of moral imputability. For him, the latter is no longer linked to the question of transcendental freedom.