The Same F ₁ but a Different F ₂ – with Absolute Identity

Here I present an analysis of what it is for an x and a y to be the same F. Unlike the Fregean Analysis (FRE), according to which ‘x is the same F as y’ is equivalent to ‘x is an F, y is an F, and x = y’, the analysis presented and defended here allows that there are possible cases in which x and y are the same F ₁ but not the same F ₂ even though x is an F ₂ and y is an F ₂ . The analysis offered here, FRE+, retains the conditions that FRE deems are necessary for being the same F while adding a further condition to allow that the same F ₁ can be a different F ₂ . Although FRE+ is compatible with there being such cases, FRE+ shares with FRE that the identity mentioned in the analysis is nothing other than absolute identity. Thus, FRE+ offers a way to allow that the same F ₁ can be a different F ₂ while avoiding conflict with the traditionally accepted logic of identity, and I argue without conflict with the Indiscernibility of Identicals in particular.