Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945

O N May 11, 1945, three days after the cessation of hostilities against Germany, President Harry S. Truman ordered a drastic cutback in lendlease aid to the Soviet Union. The following day, civilian and military officials, zealously executing the directive, halted loadings in port and even recalled several ships at sea bound for Russia. Truman's order naturally evoked loud protests from the Soviets. The Grand Alliance was disintegrating. Joseph Stalin interpreted the reduction of lend-lease as an American attempt to extort political concessions through economic pressure. The full story behind this important policy decision has not been told.' In his Memoirs, Truman denied any intention of coercing the Russians. With the war in Europe ended, he argued, large-scale lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union were no longer legally justifiable. The cutback applied to all nations, not just Russia; he had not intended the May 12 reduction to be so severe. When he had learned that his order had been interpreted too rigidly, Truman recalled, he had quickly corrected the mistake; and shipments to Russia had been resumed on as large a scale as possible.2 Those revisionist historians who have placed major responsibility for the Cold War on the United States have challenged Truman's explanation of the May 11 order and have cited the lend-lease cutback as one of the first of a series of provocative acts by his administration to coerce the Russians.3 The