A closed-loop green supply chain with retailers' competition and product recycling in the green environment under the cap-and-trade policy

Chen J., Tian Y., Chan F.T., Tang H., Che P.H.

Due to the growing awareness of environmental protection and their economic benefits, there has been rapid development in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in recent years, with a general occurrence of CLSCs led by collectors. Even with government support such as subsidies, the operation of CLSC still requires immense investment, such as purchasing recycling equipment. Nevertheless, the unprecedented economic recession during the post-pandemic era has heightened the risk of insufficient funding for CLSC. This highlights the importance of understanding the complexities involved in CLSC financing strategies, as they are crucial for ensuring the sustainability and resilience of CLSC in the face of challenges. To investigate the equilibrium decisions and financing strategy selection of CLSCs, we developed and analyzed a series of three-stage Stackelberg models, considering practical scenarios involving capital constraints, environmentally friendly green activities, government subsidies for End-of-Life (EOL) recycling, as well as introducing common trade credit financing and bank financing for generality. The findings demonstrate: (1) Under trade credit financing, it is always beneficial for the collector granting credit. Interest income can motivate the collector to recover more EOL products. (2) In addition to financing interest rates, government subsidies and remanufacturing cost savings can affect the financing strategy selection of the capital-constrained manufacturer. Our study provides guidance for managers in selecting optimal financing strategies under specific conditions. (3) The total profit of CLSC under trade credit financing is always higher and we propose a revenue-sharing contract to realize the win-win status with the optimal profit of CLSC. (4) Furthermore, our results underscore the importance of government recycling subsidies, remanufacturing cost savings, and the positive impact achieved by reducing recycling difficulties and enhancing customer awareness of green consumption.

Fang H., Yu L., Zhang Z.

Under carbon cap-and-trade regulation, to control carbon emissions and improve the recycling efficiency of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) from the traditional offline recycling channel, more enterprises attempt to simultaneously combine the online recycling platform with the digital transformation of the supply chain. Based on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with dual recycling channels and considering recycling advertising invested both in offline and online recycling channels, this paper attempts to explore the optimal recycling advertising mode which can both achieve economic and environmental performance under cap-and-trade regulation. Therefore, game models including a manufacturer and above either recycler are established, which are respectively correspond to four recycling advertising modes: manufacturer cooperates with neither recycler (MO mode), manufacturer only cooperates with the offline retailer (MR mode), manufacturer only cooperates with the online recycling platform (MT mode), and manufacturer cooperates with either recycler (MRT mode). Consequently, this paper solves the optimal decisions of the tripartite and focuses on the analysis of the impact of cooperative (competitive) recycling advertising under cap-and-trade regulation. By comparing the profits and total carbon emissions of the whole CLSC under four recycling advertising modes, the results indicate that: cooperative advertising between the manufacturer and two recyclers can achieve economic and environmental performance for the whole CLSC if the free-riding phenomenon occurs in recycling advertising. Otherwise, influenced by competitive recycling advertising, the above mode turns to the suboptimal one for the profits of two recyclers and the total carbon emissions of the CLSC. Moreover, driven by economic benefits, cooperative advertising will eventually become a consensus, but the total carbon emissions may not always be the least.

Khorshidvand B., Guitouni A., Govindan K., Soleimani H.

In recent years, significant attention has been dedicated to the design of closed-loop supply chains. However, opportunities exist to refine modeling approaches in alignment with circular economy principles. This refinement could foster the collaborative involvement of customers and retailers, resulting in a more sustainable operational framework. This study aims to address this gap, fostering waste reduction, resource conservation, and collaborative engagement in closed-loop supply chains. Thus, a multi-level, dual-channel green closed-loop supply chain that integrates circular economy principles is examined. We focus on implementing an incentive-based recycling program and examining various closed-loop supply chain settings: centralized, decentralized, and collaborative. We aim to determine optimal equilibrium prices, greening levels, and advertising strategies while considering the concurrent aspects of greening and incentivized recycling in today environmentally conscious era. By developing a demand function that integrates price elasticity, cross-price impacts, sustainability, and advertising, we evaluate performance through numerical examples and a case study in the clothing industry. The findings indicate that a collaborative approach surpasses a decentralized one regarding sustainability, guaranteeing profitability across the supply chain. The study also underscores the trade-offs between centralization and decentralization, with the former failing to ensure maximum individual profitability despite augmenting overall chain profits. Our findings can guide managers in reconciling profitability with sustainability when choosing supply chain structures, accentuating the value of collaborative strategies and green cost-sharing contracts. Furthermore, our results highlight that targeted advertising can stimulate demand for green products, and incentivizing circular economy practices through collaboration can yield positive environmental and economic outcomes.

Adnan Z.H., Chakraborty K., Bag S., Wu J.S.

To reduce carbon emissions and enable sustainable development goals, electric vehicles need to be promoted. As an evolving area of study, significant research gaps exist in the electric vehicle supply chain literature, especially in terms of competition, game structures, decision variables, green investment, etc. This paper considers two competing electric vehicle supply chains with one manufacturer and one retailer under each supply chain. The supply chain members are profit-maximizing in nature. Here, the manufacturers decide on the wholesale price and green level of the product, whereas the retailers or distributors decide on the retail selling price. The market demand is price-sensitive and also positively related to consumers’ green awareness and brand reputation of green products. Nevertheless, the green level comes with a price in the form of green investment for the manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer makes a tradeoff between the increased revenue due to greener electric vehicle technologies and the associated green investments. This paper derived the optimal decisions for the supply chain following three game-theoretical approaches. Three game scenarios represent the dynamic power structures of the market. The overall results are presented via four propositions and twelve corollaries, along with proofs. Furthermore, numerical simulations have been conducted to gain further insights into the sensitivities of the optimal actions with respect to self-price, competitor price, green level, and green investment. The overall study may assist electric vehicle businesses in having a better understanding of optimal pricing and green investment strategies under a variety of market scenarios.

Dolai M., Banu A., Mondal S.K.

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In this research work, we have developed an imperfect production inventory model under the screening process in the manufacturing system to meet the demand of quality items for the customer. Here, the novelty lies in the screening rate depending on the number of cycles and the learning effect of the workers. The motivation behind such consideration is to increase the screening rate in each subsequent cycle on account of the learning of the workers. The virtue of government policy is to keep the environment free from pollution, nowadays the production of green products is very essential although this can lead to higher production costs for the manufacturer. As a result, customers also have to pay higher purchasing costs. So, to motivate the customers extensively to buy a green product, awareness about such product is very essential. In this regard, the manufacturer adopts an innovative advertising policy, which is another novelty of this research work. Ultimately, the demand function depends on the green degree, advertisement frequency and the retailer's selling price. It is also noted that in the present competitive business market the manufacturer offers an incentive to their retailers to carry on their business smoothly. In this regard, a credit period policy of logistic nature has been taken. Finally, an integrated profit function has been developed and its feasibility has been justified taking a numerical example. The result indicates that not only an appropriate advertisement frequency but also a suitable level of the green degree of the product is more important for maintaining the integrated profit of the system and individual profit of the retailer and the manufacturer also. We have analyzed the impacts of the retailer's advertisement frequency on the optimal credit period and the retailer's profit. We have also analyzed how the learning rate of the workers affects the screening cost and the manufacturer's profit.</p>

Mandal A., Pal B.

The internet makes online purchasing convenient for consumers. Furthermore, low resources, greenhouse gas emissions, higher production costs, and various environmental issues compel firms to recycle products. This study proposes a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain comprising three members with the refurbishment of recovered products. The manufacturer has two production units (manufacturing and refurbishing) marketed online and traditional channels for fresh green products and only online for refurbished and returned products. The manufacturer uses green innovation technology to ensure that the product remains green. The recycler retrieves customers’ old products through an attractive buy-back price and environmental awareness. The study considers green level, promotion level, and selling price sensitive linear demand. This model is analyzed by comparing one centralized and eight decentralized scenarios (Stackelberg and Nash game approaches). Validation of the model is provided through a numerical example, and sensitivity analysis is performed to understand how critical parameters affect performance. This study found that the chain performance (i.e., the highest green level, the highest promotional effort level, and the highest chain profit) is optimal in the centralized system, proving that the system is highly efficient regarding environmental and economic benefits. The supply chain performance in the Nash game case where manufacturer and retailer play as a single-player is impressive and closer to the centralized model. Again, in another Nash game case where the retailer and recycler participate as a single member, a maximum number of products are recovered, which helps the recycler to achieve the highest profit.

Panja S., Mondal S.K.

Looking at the digital transformation in the retail industry many bricks and mortar (B&M) retailers are interested to run their business in an integrated way. In that direction, our study analyses a joint online and offline retail business of a retailer. Here, a utility based approach has been proposed to reflect the customers’ choice behaviour over the available alternatives, where we have incorporated product availability factor along with product valuation, price and hassle cost, as the observed factors. Moreover, keeping in mind the unobserved factors we have proposed the logit model structure for the demand estimation of the two channels. Categorizing the product based on the valuation, our findings reveal that for products like electronic and home appliances, the retailer should give more priority to low-valued and moderately premium items for his/her joint online and offline business, whereas for items like books and games, such business strategy would be the preferred choice irrespective of product premiumness. Examining the customers’ price sensitivities towards the two shopping platforms, we find that when the online price sensitivity is lower than offline, customers are more intended to buy the premium category items online. On the other side, under higher online price sensitivity, initially, for lower valued items customers prefer to buy from B&M store but when the product belongs to the premium category, a balanced shopping behaviour among the customers is noticed. We have also discussed that customers’ hassle costs in different platforms have many strategical importance on the joint online and offline business.

Jiang X., Zheng Y.

This paper incorporates consumers’ recycling behavior in remanufacturing decisions and strategies. We first empirically demonstrate that both firms’ monetary incentives and consumers’ environmental awareness positively influence consumers’ recycling behavior, then construct theoretical models to incorporate such consumers’ recycling behavior in two common remanufacturing strategies: remanufacturing by the manufacturer itself (self-remanufacturing) and by the authorized remanufacturer (authorization remanufacturing). We find that: first, when consumers are of high environmental awareness, the recycling amount driven by environmental awareness is enough to support the optimal production plan. Thus, there is no necessity for firms to implement monetary incentives. When consumers’ environmental awareness becomes lower, firms make a tradeoff between collection cost and profit improvement by increasing collection and finally decide to implement monetary incentives only when consumers’environmental awareness is low. Second, except for the new products’ price under the self-remanufacturing strategy, firms’ decisions under each strategy, such as the new products’ price, remanufactured products’ price, and the license fee, will change with consumers’ recycling behavior when consumers’ environmental awareness is not very high. As a result, the manufacturer’s profit increases with consumers’ environmental awareness no matter which remanufacturing strategy it adopts. However, the remanufacturer’s profit (under the authorization remanufacturing strategy) may decrease with consumers’ environmental awareness. Third, consumers’ recycling behavior is the determining factor for the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy selection. Our results reveal that ignoring consumers’ recycling behavior will lead to tremendous decision and strategy deviation in remanufacturing.

Cao X., Yuan P., Wen H., Zhang C., Huang K.

In this paper, we investigate a closed-loop supply chain where the original manufacturer plays as the channel leader and the third-party recycling platform participates in the recycling of used products. The remanufacturer produces remanufactured products through a remanufacturing license, and four different types of alliances are investigated as: the third-party recycling platform and the original manufacturer alliance, the third-party recycling platform and the remanufacturer alliance, the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer alliance, the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer and the third-party recycling platform alliance. We compare the overall benefits of different alliances and find that the alliance of the original manufacturer, the remanufacturer and the third-party recycling platform has the largest income. We set up a reasonable profit distribution mechanism under the alliance, which can make the three parties get the optimal benefit and make the whole CLSC remanufacturing alliance reach the Pareto optimum. We also compare the recycling rates across alliances and find that the recycling rate is highest in the case of the remanufacturer and the third-party recycling platform alliance, whose recycling rate is positively correlated with recycling costs. Importantly, we make a comparative analysis of the equilibrium decisions and profit distribution of the four alliance models with the participation of the third-party platform. Both the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer need to seek a third-party platform as partners, but if there are conflicts between two manufacturers, the third-party recycling platform may become a mediator between the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer in the supply chain. The results of our study will provide a theoretical basis for enterprises to choose the appropriate alliance in closed-loop supply chains.

Asghari T., Taleizadeh A.A., Jolai F., Moshtagh M.S.

This research examines a single-stage green closed-loop supply chain (GCLSC) in which the green manufacturer, retailer, and collector try to reform the environmental effects of their operations, products, and services across the value chain according to their environmental responsibilities. The collector is responsible for performing the take-back program of used green products, recycling, and trading second-hand products. In this paper, the environmental responsibility of all three supply chain members is considered. The demand function of eco-friendly products is defined as a function of retail price, environmental efforts of the green manufacturer and retailer, the sensitivity of environmentally conscious consumers to their efforts, and the worth of off voucher given to the consumer for returning used product. For coordinating this GCLSC, first, the mathematical model of the decentralized model and all possible coalition forms are examined. Then, the cooperative game theory , including Nucleolus solution mechanism (NSM) and Shapley value mechanism (SVM), and different contracting structures, including cost-sharing (CS), revenue sharing (RS), and two-part tariff (TPT) contract, are utilized. Major goal of this research is to compare these two classes of coordination models in terms of economic and environmental dimensions to choose the best strategy for channel coordination. Eventually, computational and practical investigations reveal that forming the grand coalition yields better results than contracts in terms of achieving environmental goals and total profit. Also, the economic advantages are different for each coordination model. Besides coordination mechanisms explored in this research, as a future study, one can incorporate the effect of competition between green and traditional manufacturers on supply chain performance. Finally, managerial insights of this research guide the managers towards desirable practices to promote coordination and achieve a fair allocation of profit. • Develops a green closed-loop supply chain (GCLSC) including green manufacturer, retailer, and collector. • Obtains the optimal pricing, environmental responsibilities, and rate of return decisions. • The environmental responsibility of all three supply chain members is considered. • Grand coalition yields better results than contracts in terms of achieving environmental goals and total profit. • The economic advantages are different for each coordination model.

Pal B., Sarkar A.

With the intensive growth of internet use, the customers choose the online market as the right preference. Hence, manufacturers are attracted to launch an online channel that includes a retail channel. To maintain the versatile demand types of products, a retailer is to stock more than one product of the same category, and consequently, he has to purchase products from different manufacturers. This article formulates a dual-channel supply chain model with two manufacturers and a standard retailer, where the optimal online prices, retail prices, wholesale prices, and level of green improvements are decided under different types of decision making power strategies such as Centralized, joint manufacturers Stackelberg, separate Stackelberg, Nash games are investigated. The optimal results are derived and compared with the help of a numerical example. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is performed to scrutinize the effect of some important parameters. It is found that the green level is higher in a double dual-channel model than in a single dual-channel model. Moreover, the own-channel price sensitivity parameters affect the profit functions of the members negatively. The manufacturers must control the cost-coefficients of greening to increase the green level of the manufacturing products.

Fadavi A., Jolai F., Taleizadeh A.A.

Environmental sustainability is becoming a leading indicator for evaluating supply chain management. This study considers two players, a manufacturer and a retailer, that offer substitutable products and compete in green and price-sensitive markets. This article studies members’ decisions regarding pricing competition and cooperation (marketing cost sharing) for green products in a vertical supply chain. Furthermore, it investigates the effects of their decisions to obtain an optimal profit on the green products supply chain using the Stackelberg game theory approach under competition. This article studies several new green products structures within a supply chain and researches their environmental performance impact. Environmental responsibilities are explored in a supply chain that consumers are informed about eco-friendly products. The manufacturer decides the wholesale of its products, designing and producing a new green product to maximize its expected profit. The retailer chooses the retail price and amount of effort for green marketing of the products to maximize its expected profit. The results show that cooperation may not always be to the benefit of all partners; therefore, the best strategy for all partners is when an association is not applied. According to the research results, the retailer tends to produce and sell greener products (higher greenness) to maximize profits. At the same time, the manufacturer has to spend more cost to make greener products. The main influential factor for choosing the type of production of green products is market size. If the market size is more than predicted, the best choice for the production of green products is development-intensive green products; conversely, if the market potential is low, marginal cost-intensive green products are the best choice.

Taleizadeh A.A., Shahriari M., Sana S.S.

In this paper, we consider a two level dual channel green supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer with a separate sales channel for the manufacturer. The manufacturer uses green technology in its production and is required to produce in accordance with the cap and trade regulation. Using game theory, we compare cases where members decide to compete or cooperate with each other in terms of pricing and production. Our main contributions are studying the dual channel supply chain model where a manufacturer is regulated by the cap and trade system, using green production and also on their decision as to whether to compete or cooperate with a value-adding retailer. We also investigated the impact of green production on lowering the amount of carbon emissions produced. In the present study, supply chain members are advised to cooperate with each other in order to achieve the environmental benefits of the cap and trade system and, to avoid market failure, we further recommend that manufacturers should invest in green technologies for their production.

Mandal A., Pal B.

This article investigates game-theoretic approaches in a competitive supply chain model with imperfect production and a two-tier credit facility under the environment of carbon emissions. In this environment, we incorporate a manufacturer and two rival retailers who compete against one another for selling price and advertisement of a product, where the members offer trade credit facilities to the downstream players. We consider that the manufacturer invests in green technology to curtail the emission during the production and rework process. The retailers provide advertisements to expand their businesses, where market demands are dependent on their selling prices, advertisement frequencies, and the green innovation level. Here, we analyze the model under the cap-and-trade policy for various subcases of the centralized and decentralized systems and discuss a solution algorithm for the optimal results. For the practical feasibility test of the model, numerical analysis is examined, and the impact of variations of the critical parameters is studied. The study's primary motive is to figure out the optimal operative strategies and collaborative actions on the decision variables, which leads to the profits of the supply chain to a lofty extent. We observe that the offered credit periods are highly responsive to the profit functions so that the chain members have to be more careful and draw a compact plan for credit policy. Moreover, the manufacturer has to invest in green technology up to a certain level, as, after that level, high investment costs will hamper the optimal profit. Besides, the retailers must have adequate policies for selling prices and advertisement frequencies to acquire a higher yield.

Pal B., Sarkar A.

Due to the hugely populated world, recycling of the used products has become the most significant perspective in e-commerce. The scientists have been exploring how increases the degree of recyclability and the green innovation level. This paper considers a supply chain with a manufacturer, a retailer, a supplier, and a collector. The manufacturer can increase or decrease the level of green innovation by changing the quality of raw materials. He sells them through his direct channel as well as the retailer’s traditional channel. The retailer enforces the strategy promotional effort for enlarging his market demand. After formulating the problem, the strategies in collector-led, supplier-led, collector–supplier Nash, and collector–supplier–retailer Nash game are studied under manufacturer Stackelberg games along with the centralized policy. The parameters’ sensitivity has been analyzed to the profits and decision variables and then draw significant managerial insights. The model declares the optimal strategies for each player as well as the chain. It is achieved that the higher level of green innovation and promotional effort always increases all the profit. The optimal pricing decisions be lowest under the Collector–Supplier Nash game.

Guo X., He Y., Ignatius J.

Naumov V., Aloshynskyi Y., Bauer M.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has significantly disrupted global food supply chains, exacerbating existing food security challenges. To mitigate these disruptions, this study proposes a comprehensive approach to establishing sustainable intermodal terminals and technology parks along the Ukrainian–Polish border. To address this research issue, we analyzed the Ukrainian and global grain markets using publicly available statistical data. This analysis revealed the need to enhance grain transit through Poland, with terminal development identified as a crucial factor. Furthermore, a thorough analysis of the Polish freight rail transport market provided forecasts of potential demand for rail transit. Utilizing Petri nets as a modeling tool, we simulated the transit system at the macro level. Based on this simulation, we identified potential locations for freight terminals at the Ukrainian border near EU countries. Employing the AHP methodology, we evaluated these potential locations and selected Kovel in the Volyn region of Ukraine as the most promising alternative. For this location, we proposed the development of a new technological park. The implementation of this project, with the capacity to process and clear up to 600 wagons per day, would facilitate the transshipment of up to 3000 tons of grain per day from Ukraine to EU countries.

Chen H., Xu Q.

ABSTRACTSecuring exclusive premium content can enhance a platform's competitive edge, becoming a key factor in the success of online platform competition. This study examines exclusivity strategies under vertical separation and vertical integration, assessing their impacts on the endogenous quality and pricing decisions of competing platforms, as well as on consumer and overall welfare. Our findings reveal that the platform with exclusive premium content generally increase their quality and pricing, whereas the competitor tends to lower theirs. However, network effects moderate these price increases in vertical integration. Network effects play a crucial role, making premium content provider weighs the benefits of exclusivity against the potential for broader consumer engagement through nonexclusivity. Although exclusivity always reduces consumer surplus under vertical separation, it potentially aligns with consumer surplus in vertical integration. Additionally, our analysis of asymmetric market conditions reveals that premium content provider often forms exclusive agreement with the dominant platform, exacerbating quality and price disparities. Given these dynamics, we suggest that policymakers should rigorously evaluate the impacts of exclusivity on consumer surplus, offering crucial insights for antitrust authorities on the regulatory challenges in online platform markets.

Dong X., Wan G., Zeng P., Song C., Cui S., Liu Y.

Xiao Q., Zheng Y., Zhang J.

Zhang Y., Zou F., Peng W., Song S., Wang C.

Based on the consumer speculative purchase problem in the full-reduction promotion scenario, considering the heterogeneity of strategic consumers’ valuation of the initial purchase intention commodity and the add-on item, as well as the possibility that consumers may be dissatisfied with the add-on items after receiving the goods, a single-period pricing decision model is constructed, and the optimal pricing strategies of the platform provider are obtained in the two cases of disallowing the return of the goods and providing a money-back guarantee, respectively. It is found that optimal original pricing exists for both commodities in both models making the platform provider most profitable. Furthermore, since the promotional discount rate is an exogenous variable, the optimal promotional price for the combination of the two commodities is obtained. It was also found that increasing the degree of relatedness of the two commodities and consumer satisfaction with the add-on items can effectively stifle speculative purchasing behavior. By comprehensively comparing the optimal profits of platform providers in the two cases, we find that neither model is absolutely dominant and gives the critical conditions for platform providers to choose different return strategies. Finally, the influence of relevant parameters on the optimal pricing strategy and profit of the platform provider under the two models is analyzed through numerical examples, which provides a reference for the platform provider to formulate the optimal strategy according to their own situation. Finally, the influence of relevant parameters on the optimal pricing strategy and profit of the platform provider is analyzed through specific data, which provides a reference for the platform provider to determine the optimal pricing and return strategy according to the operating conditions.

Sugapriya C., Fariya Azleena A., Nagarajan D., Kavikumar J.

He P., Chen Z., Mardani A., Xu H.

C S., A F.A., Deivanayagampillai N., Jacob K.

Abstract Conventional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) models operate on the implicit assumption that all received products are flawless. Current EOQ models for items of defectiveness implicitly suggest that suppliers do not conduct a comprehensive assessment, even though they loosen this presumption and are more applicable to scenarios in reality. This paper presents a significant EOQ model. This model accounts for the possibility of mistakes occurring while inspection of the product. Because things are piled high in stock, breaking of products takes place. These goods are stored and sold at once, with damage costs included. Furthermore, governments have made limiting carbon emissions their top priority. In an effort to improve the environment, the tax rates in the price of carbon emissions have been included. This model is distinct because it closes the research gap by taking into account breakable items under inspection errors with damage cost, and carbon emission cost. The ideal order quantity that optimizes the total profit is determined. It is important to note that this model is constructed in a fuzzy manner by using a triangular fuzzy number to represent the cost of accepting a broken object. Applications of this idea include shipping commodities. A numerical illustration of the ideal solution is given and the sensitivity studies based on analytical results are provided. The current study addresses how changes in a few parameters influence the ideal overall cost. Findings reveal that altering the products screening cost does not greatly affect the total profit. So retailers should increase the inspection cost so that they can give good products to their customers. Additionally, managerial implications are also provided.

Zhang C., Yang F., Shan F.

Chen W., Cui M., Quayson M., Du H.

This study considers the research on electricity pricing and carbon reduction technology decisions of electricity supply chain enterprises under different power structures. It constructs a two-level electricity supply chain game model composed of two electricity producers and a single electricity retailer. By comparing the equilibrium solution results, the main research results are as follows: (1) in the market structure where electricity producers and electricity retailers make decisions at the same time, electricity producers are more willing to invest in low-carbon technologies and increase carbon emission reduction. The electricity retailer also set the lowest electricity prices at this time, and electricity demand is the highest. (2) In the case of the Stackelberg game for electricity producers, the wholesale electricity price is the highest, and the electricity producers obtain the most profits. In the case of the Stackelberg game for electricity retailers, the electricity price is the highest, and the profit of the electricity retailer is the highest. (3) In the market structure dominated by electricity retailers, the electricity price is the highest, and the electricity producers reduce the investment in carbon emission reduction technology after observation; the carbon emission reduction intensity is the least, and the electricity demand is also the least. (4) With the increase of price competition coefficient, the intensity of carbon emission reduction, electricity demand, electricity producers, and electricity retailer profit increase. However, as the competition coefficient of carbon reduction technology increases, these equilibrium solutions decline. We verify the above conclusions using multi-agent simulation.

Kar C., Aktar M.S., De M., Maiti M., Das P.

Sarada Y., Sangeetha S.