Self-Defense Against Conditional Threats

Clark D.J.

Venezia L.

John Locke says that a victim is permitted to kill a Conditional Threat in self-defense. Yet, David Rodin argues that killing is disproportionate to the harm averted and is therefore impermissible. But Rodin mischaracterizes the situation faced by a Conditional Threat victim as analyzed by Locke. In this article, I aim to provide a more satisfactory reading of Locke on self-defense against Conditional Threats, particularly of the thesis that killing involves a proportionate response to the harm averted. In addition to this, I also aim to further elaborate and defend Locke's view. First, I show that a Conditional Threat deprives his victim of her freedom to act as she thinks fit, without having to depend on the Conditional Threat's arbitrary will. Second, I argue that an interest in not being deprived of one's freedom to act as one thinks fit, without having to depend on another person's arbitrary will, by a conditional threat of deadly harm, is of sufficient value to make killing a proportionate act, especially if the person is highly morally culpable. If killing also meets the necessity condition of justified self-defense (admittedly, a big “if”), it follows that Locke, not Rodin, holds the correct view.

Lang G.

Defence cases with an escalatory structure, in which the levels of violence between aggressor and defender start out as minor and then become major, even lethal, raise sharp problems for defence theory, and for our understanding of the conditions of defence: proportionality, necessity, and imminence. It is argued here that defenders are not morally required to withdraw from participation in these cases, and that defensive escalations do not offend against any of the conditions of defence, on an adequate understanding of them. No plausible interpretation of proportionality or necessity excludes defensive permissions in escalatory cases. Moreover, the structure of escalatory defensive cases also sheds useful light on permissible responses to conditional deadly threats. This is because we can analyse conditional deadly threats as disguised cases of escalation. Because defensive resistance is permissible in escalatory cases, it is also permissible in cases involving conditional deadly threats.

Quong J.

This book provides an account of the central moral principles that regulate the permissible use of defensive force. The book argues that we cannot understand the morality of defensive force until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. In developing this view the book offers original accounts of liability, proportionality, and necessity. It also argues, contra the dominant view in the literature, that self-defence can sometimes be justified on the basis of an agent-relative prerogative to give greater weight to one’s own life and interests. The book also provides a novel conception of individual rights against harm. Unlike some, who believe that our rights against harm are fact-relative, Quong argues that our rights against being harmed by others must, in certain respects, be sensitive to the evidence that others can reasonably be expected to possess. The final chapter provides an extended defence of the means principle, a principle that prohibits harmfully using other persons’ bodies or other rightful property unless those persons are duty bound to permit this use or have otherwise waived their claims against such use.

Ferzan K.K.

This chapter examines the moral justifiability of “stand your ground” (SYG) laws. First, it sets forth the parameters of self-defense as understood in the philosophical literature. Next, it focuses on the necessity limitation and questions whether this limitation can be defensibly weakened to accommodate SYG laws. Finding no comfort for SYG statutes in a weakened necessity limitation, the chapter turns to the proportionality constraint and examines approaches that increase the interests that may permissibly be defended as well as approaches that abandon proportionality altogether. Finally, this chapter maintains that the most perspicuous lens through which to view SYG laws is that of law enforcement because what SYG laws actually do is place citizens in the role of police. The justifiability of such enforcement authority turns, then, on two further questions. It must be appropriate for citizens to serve this function. But second, it must be appropriate for the state to stand its ground.

Tomlin P.

Lazar S.

McMahan J.

Draper K.

Finlay C.J.

The words 'rebellion' and 'revolution' have gained renewed prominence in the vocabulary of world politics and so has the question of justifiable armed 'resistance'. In this book Christopher J. Finlay extends just war theory to provide a rigorous and systematic account of the right to resist oppression and of the forms of armed force it can justify. He specifies the circumstances in which rebels have the right to claim recognition as legitimate actors in revolutionary wars against domestic tyranny and injustice and wars of liberation against wrongful foreign occupation and colonialism. Arguing that violence is permissible only in a narrow range of cases, Finlay shows that the rules of engagement vary during and between different conflicts and explores the potential for irregular tactics to become justifiable, such as non-uniformed guerrillas and civilian disguise, the assassination of political leaders and regime officials, and the waging of terrorist war against civilian targets.

Frowe H.

Lazar S.

Rodin D.

McMahan J.

Tadros V.

One of the most interesting questions raised in Cecile Fabre’s Cosmopolitan War concerns war for the sake of resources. Fabre argues that it is sometimes permissible to go to war for the sake of resources that the poor are entitled to. I agree with this, but I think it is true only in very restricted circumstances. I consider a number of arguments in favour of resource wars, showing many of them to fail. The most promising argument, I suggest, is that those who possess resources that have unjustly been secured are complicit in posing future threats by contributing to a market for unjustly secured resources. Whilst this argument has some promise, even it, I suggest, is in no way decisive.