The Demands of Necessity

Quong J.

This book provides an account of the central moral principles that regulate the permissible use of defensive force. The book argues that we cannot understand the morality of defensive force until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. In developing this view the book offers original accounts of liability, proportionality, and necessity. It also argues, contra the dominant view in the literature, that self-defence can sometimes be justified on the basis of an agent-relative prerogative to give greater weight to one’s own life and interests. The book also provides a novel conception of individual rights against harm. Unlike some, who believe that our rights against harm are fact-relative, Quong argues that our rights against being harmed by others must, in certain respects, be sensitive to the evidence that others can reasonably be expected to possess. The final chapter provides an extended defence of the means principle, a principle that prohibits harmfully using other persons’ bodies or other rightful property unless those persons are duty bound to permit this use or have otherwise waived their claims against such use.

McMahan J.

Tadros V.

McMahan J.

Draper K.

Otsuka M.

Lazar S.

Frowe H.

Bazargan S.

Minimal responsibility threateners (MRTs) are epistemically justified but mistaken in thinking that imposing a nonnegligible risk on others is permissible. On standard accounts, an MRT forfeits her right not to be defensively killed. I propose an alternative account: an MRT is liable only to the degree of harm equivalent to what she risks causing multiplied by her degree of responsibility. Harm imposed on the MRT above that amount is justified as a lesser evil, relative to allowing the MRT to kill her victim. This hybrid account, which generalizes to those are who are more than minimally responsible, has considerable advantages.

Firth J.M., Quong J.

A person who is liable to defensive harm has forfeited his rights against the imposition of the harm, and so is not wronged if that harm is imposed. A number of philosophers, most notably Jeff McMahan, argue for an instrumental account of liability, whereby a person is liable to defensive harm when he is either morally or culpably responsible for an unjust threat of harm to others, and when the imposition of defensive harm is necessary to avert the threatened unjust harm. Others may favour a purely noninstrumental account of liability: one that looks only to the past behaviour of the potentially liable person. We argue that both views are vulnerable to serious objections. Instead we develop and defend a new view of liability to defensive harm: the pluralist account. The pluralist account states that liability to defensive harm has at least two bases. First, if an attacker is morally or culpably responsible for an unjust attack then he has forfeited what we call his agency right, and in doing so he has made himself partially liable to defensive harm. Whether the attacker is fully liable to defensive harm depends, however, on whether the imposition of defensive harm would infringe a different right held by the attacker: his humanitarian right. Humanitarian rights are rights to be provided with urgently needed resources or to be protected from serious harms when others can do so at reasonably low cost. We argue the pluralist account avoids the objections to which the instrumental and noninstrumental views are vulnerable, coheres with our intuitive reactions in a wide range of cases, and sheds new light on the way different rights combine to determine a person’s liability to suffer harm.

TADROS V.

In his recent book, Killing in War, Jeff McMahan sets out a number of conditions for a person to be liable to attack, provided the attack is used to avert an objectively unjust threat: (1) The threat, if realized, will wrongfully harm another; (2) the person is responsible for creating the threat; (3) killing the person is necessary to avert the threat, and (4) killing the person is a proportionate response to the threat. The present article focuses on McMahan's second condition, which links liability with responsibility. McMahan's use of the responsibility criterion, the article contends, is too restrictive as an account of liability in general and an account of liability to be killed in particular. In order to defend this claim, the article disambiguates the concept of liability and explores its role in the philosophical analysis of the permission to cause harm to others.

LAZAR S.

Rodin D.

Tadros V.

Uniacke S.

Proportionality is widely accepted as a necessary condition of justified self-defense. What gives rise to this particular condition and what role it plays in the justification of self-defense seldom receive focused critical attention. In this paper I address the standard of proportionality applicable to personal self-defense and the role that proportionality plays in justifying the use of harmful force in self-defense. I argue against an equivalent harm view of proportionality in self-defense, and in favor of a standard of proportionality in self-defense that requires comparable seriousness and takes into account the wrong, as opposed simply to the harm that the victim is fending off. I distinguish the standard of proportionality in self-defense from proportionality in circumstances of necessity, and I discuss whether proportionality is an internal or an external constraint on the right of self-defense.

Venezia L., Rivera-López E.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that killing a Conditional Threat usually involves an unnecessary act of self-defense, so killing this aggressor is usually morally impermissible. We defend this thesis by showing that this case is fundamentally similar to a case involving an Unconditional Threat in which the victim can flee to safety although this involves incurring a minor cost. Second, we analyze the thresholds of maximal harm that victims are required to bear before they are permitted to defend themselves by harming their aggressors related to the conditions of necessity and of proportionality. We argue that the maximal harm a victim is required to bear sanctioned by the condition of necessity is, all else being equal, lower than the maximal harm that a victim must bear sanctioned by the condition of proportionality. This result is relevant for determining in which cases victims may use lethal force against Conditional Threats, both in the individual case and also in the case of war.