An Existential Attention Norm for Affectively Biased Sentient Beings: A Buddhist Intervention from Buddhaghosa

Whiteley E.K.

Smith S.M.

Smith S.M.

Smith S.M.

In this paper, I explore a debate between some Indian Buddhist schools regarding the nature of the underlying tendencies or anusaya-s. I focus here primarily on the ninth chapter of Kathāvatthu’s representation of a dispute about whether an anusaya can be said to have intentional object. I also briefly treat of Vasubandhu’s defense of the Sautrāntika view of anuśaya in the opening section of the fifth chapter his Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. Following Vasubandhu, I argue against the Thervādin Abhidharmikas that the underlying tendencies (anusaya-s) can be identified with their active manifestations (pariyuṭṭhāna). Etymologically, the notion of anusaya denotes a kind of latency, dormancy or otherwise ‘below the surface’ propensity. It can literally be translated as ‘that which lies or dwells beneath or alongside’. I will translate the term as ‘underlying tendency’, but philosophically speaking, it is most important to understand that the notion of anusaya refers to dispositions that condition current experience in a tacit way. The task of a philosophical account of the anusaya-s is to explain how their implicit conditioning influence shapes occurrent mental activity. The Indian Buddhist philosophers exercised an enormous amount of energy in attempting to explain this relation. A thorough examination of this dialectic has two important fruits to bear. The first is that the Buddhists can help us explain in precise detail how the mind is affectively layered. That is, they have a plausible account of how the mind is both responsive in real time to the objects it encounters in the world, while at the same time being tacitly conditioned by its own history of affective bias. Indeed, as we will see, the Buddhists were deeply concerned with how processes of affective bias were operating at the deepest levels of the mind and how we ought to conceive of their influence on our ordinary processes of perception and cognition. Second, this local position within the Buddhist milieu is indicative of a wider propensity in Buddhist philosophy to blend analyses of affectively-biased intentions and causation. I submit that this blending could be helpful in a more global for contemporary discussions of the mind in philosophy and science.

Irving Z.C.

Flanagan O.

This volume offers a snapshot of the present state of academic investigation into the nature of Buddhist ethics. Over the past decade many scholars have come to think that the project of fitting Buddhist ethical thought into Western philosophical categories may be of limited utility, and the focus of investigation has shifted in a number of new directions. Contributions to these recent investigation from many of the leading figures in the academic study of Buddhist philosophy are collected here alongside exciting new work from a number of early-career scholars. Topics include the nature of Buddhist ethics as a whole as well as the role in Buddhist ethics of karma and rebirth, mindfulness, narrative, intention, personhood, agency, free will, politics, anger, and equanimity, among other areas. The volume offers a rich and accessible introduction to contemporary work on Buddhist thought for students and scholars new to this area of philosophy, as well as chapters taking up more technical philosophical and textual topics. The contributors aim to engage Buddhist traditions in a rigorous, critical, and respectful philosophical dialogue, rather than to document these traditions as historical curiosities. The chapters of this volume stand as contributions to the emerging field of cosmopolitan philosophy, demonstrating by example why considering ethical questions such as how we ought to live, act, and train our minds from a plurality of cultural perspectives is itself an ethical imperative today.

Watzl S.

Siegel S.

Wu W.

McRae E.

In this article I criticize some traditional impartiality practices in Western philosophical ethics and argue in favor of Marilyn Friedman’s dialogical practice of eliminating bias. But, I argue, the dialogical approach depends on a more fundamental practice of equanimity. Drawing on the works of Tibetan Buddhist thinkers Patrul Rinpoche and Khenpo Ngawang Pelzang, I develop a Buddhist-feminist concept of equanimity and argue that, despite some differences with the Western impartiality practices, equanimity is an impartiality practice that is not only psychologically feasible but also central to loving relationships. I conclude by suggesting ways that feminist dialogical practices for eliminating bias and meditative practices are mutually supportive.

Mole C.

de Sousa R.