Attention norms in Siegel’s The Rationality of Perception

Gopnik A., O’Grady S., Lucas C.G., Griffiths T.L., Wente A., Bridgers S., Aboody R., Fung H., Dahl R.E.

How was the evolution of our unique biological life history related to distinctive human developments in cognition and culture? We suggest that the extended human childhood and adolescence allows a balance between exploration and exploitation, between wider and narrower hypothesis search, and between innovation and imitation in cultural learning. In particular, different developmental periods may be associated with different learning strategies. This relation between biology and culture was probably coevolutionary and bidirectional: life-history changes allowed changes in learning, which in turn both allowed and rewarded extended life histories. In two studies, we test how easily people learn an unusual physical or social causal relation from a pattern of evidence. We track the development of this ability from early childhood through adolescence and adulthood. In the physical domain, preschoolers, counterintuitively, perform better than school-aged children, who in turn perform better than adolescents and adults. As they grow older learners are less flexible: they are less likely to adopt an initially unfamiliar hypothesis that is consistent with new evidence. Instead, learners prefer a familiar hypothesis that is less consistent with the evidence. In the social domain, both preschoolers and adolescents are actually the most flexible learners, adopting an unusual hypothesis more easily than either 6-y-olds or adults. There may be important developmental transitions in flexibility at the entry into middle childhood and in adolescence, which differ across domains.

Siegel S.

Christoff K., Irving Z.C., Fox K.C., Spreng R.N., Andrews-Hanna J.R.

Mind-wandering is often defined as task-unrelated or stimulus-unrelated thought. In this Review, Christoff and colleagues present a definition for mind-wandering that places more emphasis on the dynamic nature of this process. They also examine the brain networks underlying mind-wandering and its involvement in various brain disorders. Most research on mind-wandering has characterized it as a mental state with contents that are task unrelated or stimulus independent. However, the dynamics of mind-wandering — how mental states change over time — have remained largely neglected. Here, we introduce a dynamic framework for understanding mind-wandering and its relationship to the recruitment of large-scale brain networks. We propose that mind-wandering is best understood as a member of a family of spontaneous-thought phenomena that also includes creative thought and dreaming. This dynamic framework can shed new light on mental disorders that are marked by alterations in spontaneous thought, including depression, anxiety and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

Irving Z.C.

Although mind-wandering occupies up to half of our waking thoughts, it is seldom discussed in philosophy. My paper brings these neglected thoughts into focus. I propose that mind-wandering is unguided attention. Guidance in my sense concerns how attention is monitored and regulated as it unfolds over time. Roughly speaking, someone’s attention is guided if she would feel pulled back, were she distracted from her current focus. Because our wandering thoughts drift unchecked from topic to topic, they are unguided. One motivation for my theory is what I call the “Puzzle of the Purposeful Wanderer”. On the one hand, mind-wandering seems essentially purposeless; almost by definition, it contrasts with goal-directed cognition. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that our minds frequently wander to our goals. My solution to the puzzle is this: mind-wandering is purposeless in one way—it is unguided—but purposeful in another—it is frequently caused, and thus motivated, by our goals. Another motivation for my theory is to distinguish mind-wandering from two antithetical forms of cognition: absorption (e.g. engrossment in an intellectual idea) and rumination (e.g. fixation on one’s distress). Surprisingly, previous theories cannot capture these distinctions. I can: on my view, absorption and rumination are guided, whereas mind-wandering is not. My paper has four parts. Section 1 spells out the puzzle. Sections 2 and 3 explicate two extant views of mind-wandering—the first held by most cognitive scientists, the second by Thomas Metzinger. Section 4 uses the limitations of these theories to motivate my own: mind-wandering is unguided attention.

Hills T.T., Todd P.M., Lazer D., Redish A.D., Couzin I.D.

Search is a ubiquitous property of life. Although diverse domains have worked on search problems largely in isolation, recent trends across disciplines indicate that the formal properties of these problems share similar structures and, often, similar solutions. Moreover, internal search (e.g., memory search) shows similar characteristics to external search (e.g., spatial foraging), including shared neural mechanisms consistent with a common evolutionary origin across species. Search problems and their solutions also scale from individuals to societies, underlying and constraining problem solving, memory, information search, and scientific and cultural innovation. In summary, search represents a core feature of cognition, with a vast influence on its evolution and processes across contexts and requiring input from multiple domains to understand its implications and scope.

Lucas C.G., Bridgers S., Griffiths T.L., Gopnik A.

Children learn causal relationships quickly and make far-reaching causal inferences from what they observe. Acquiring abstract causal principles that allow generalization across different causal relationships could support these abilities. We examine children's ability to acquire abstract knowledge about the forms of causal relationships and show that in some cases they learn better than adults. Adults and 4- and 5-year-old children saw events suggesting that a causal relationship took one of two different forms, and their generalization to a new set of objects was then tested. One form was a more typical disjunctive relationship; the other was a more unusual conjunctive relationship. Participants were asked to both judge the causal efficacy of the objects and to design actions to generate or prevent an effect. Our results show that children can learn the abstract properties of causal relationships using only a handful of events. Moreover, children were more likely than adults to generalize the unusual conjunctive relationship, suggesting that they are less biased by prior assumptions and pay more attention to current evidence. These results are consistent with the predictions of a hierarchical Bayesian model.

Seiver E., Gopnik A., Goodman N.D.

Children rely on both evidence and prior knowledge to make physical causal inferences; this study explores whether they make attributions about others' behavior in the same manner. A total of one hundred and fifty-nine 4- and 6-year-olds saw 2 dolls interacting with 2 activities, and explained the dolls' actions. In the person condition, each doll acted consistently across activities, but differently from each other. In the situation condition, the two dolls acted differently for each activity, but both performed the same actions. Both age groups provided more "person" explanations (citing features of the doll) in the person condition than in the situation condition. In addition, 6-year-olds showed an overall bias toward "person" explanations. As in physical causal inference, social causal inference combines covariational evidence and prior knowledge.

Buchak L.

Killingsworth M.A., Gilbert D.T.

The iPhone Hap App reveals that wandering thoughts lead to unhappiness.

Kane M.J., Brown L.H., McVay J.C., Silvia P.J., Myin-Germeys I., Kwapil T.R.

An experience-sampling study of 124 undergraduates, pretested on complex memory-span tasks, examined the relation between working memory capacity (WMC) and the experience of mind wandering in daily life. Over 7 days, personal digital assistants signaled subjects eight times daily to report immediately whether their thoughts had wandered from their current activity, and to describe their psychological and physical context. WMC moderated the relation between mind wandering and activities' cognitive demand. During challenging activities requiring concentration and effort, higher-WMC subjects maintained on-task thoughts better, and mind-wandered less, than did lower-WMC subjects. The results were therefore consistent with theories of WMC emphasizing the role of executive attention and control processes in determining individual differences and their cognitive consequences.

Cohen J.D., McClure S.M., Yu A.J.

Many large and small decisions we make in our daily lives—which ice cream to choose, what research projects to pursue, which partner to marry—require an exploration of alternatives before committing to and exploiting the benefits of a particular choice. Furthermore, many decisions require re-evaluation, and further exploration of alternatives, in the face of changing needs or circumstances. That is, often our decisions depend on a higher level choice: whether to exploit well known but possibly suboptimal alternatives or to explore risky but potentially more profitable ones. How adaptive agents choose between exploitation and exploration remains an important and open question that has received relatively limited attention in the behavioural and brain sciences. The choice could depend on a number of factors, including the familiarity of the environment, how quickly the environment is likely to change and the relative value of exploiting known sources of reward versus the cost of reducing uncertainty through exploration. There is no known generally optimal solution to the exploration versus exploitation problem, and a solution to the general case may indeed not be possible. However, there have been formal analyses of the optimal policy under constrained circumstances. There have also been specific suggestions of how humans and animals may respond to this problem under particular experimental conditions as well as proposals about the brain mechanisms involved. Here, we provide a brief review of this work, discuss how exploration and exploitation may be mediated in the brain and highlight some promising future directions for research.

Smith A.

I forgot a close friend’s birthday last year. A few days after the fact, I realized that this important date had come and gone without my so much as sending a card or giving her a call. I was mortified. What kind of a friend could forget such a thing? Within minutes I was on the phone to her, acknowledging my fault and offering my apologies. But what, exactly, was the nature of my fault in this case? After all, I did not consciously choose to forget this special day or deliberately decide to ignore it. I did not intend to hurt my friend’s feelings or even foresee that my conduct would have this effect. I just forgot. It didn’t occur to me. I failed to notice. And yet, despite the apparent involuntariness of this failure, there was no doubt in either of our minds that I was, indeed, responsible for it. Although my friend was quick to pardon my thoughtlessness and to dismiss it as trivial and unimportant, the act of pardoning itself is simply a way of renouncing certain critical responses which it is acknowledged would, in principle, be justified. Moments such as these—which for many of us, I imagine, are more common than we would like to admit—reveal a deep tension in our ordinary thinking about the conditions of moral responsibility. If asked, most of us would probably say that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of legitimate moral assessment. And yet, as the case above was meant to illustrate, we regularly do hold ourselves and others responsible for things that do not appear to reflect a conscious choice or decision. Indeed, we quite often respond to people’s spontaneous at-

German T.P., Defeyter M.A.

In thecandle problem (Duncker, 1945), subjects must attach a candle to a vertical surface, using only a box of tacks and a book of matches. Subjects exhibitfunctional fixedness by failing, or being slow, to make use of one object (the tack box) as a support, rather than as a container, in their solutions. This failure to produce alternate functions is measured against improved performance when the tack box is presented empty rather than full of tacks (i.e., not preutilized as a container). Using an analogous task, we show that functional fixedness can be demonstrated in older children (6- and 7-year-olds); they are significantly slower to use a box as a support when its containment function has been demonstrated than when it has not. However, younger children (5-year-olds) are immune to this effect, showing no advantage when the standard function is not demonstrated. Moreover, their performance under conditions of preutilization is better than that of both older groups. These results are interpreted in terms of children’s developing intuitions about function and the effects of past experience on problem solving.

SMITH S.M.

ABSTRACT This article argues that our attention is pervasively biased by embodied affects and that we are normatively assessable in light of this. From a contemporary perspective, normative theorizing about attention is a relatively new trend (Siegel 2017: Ch. 9, Irving 2019, Bommarito 2018: Ch. 5). However, Buddhist philosophy has provided us with a well-spring of normatively rich theorizing about attention from its inception. This article will address how norms of attention are dealt with in Buddhaghosa’s (5th-6th CE) claims about how wholesome forms of empathy can go wrong. Through this analysis, I will show that Buddhist philosophers like Buddhaghosa think there is an existential norm of attention, one that commands us not just to pay attention to ourselves and the world properly, but one whereby we are exhorted to attend to ourselves in a way that gradually transforms our cognitive-emotional constitution so that we become liberated from suffering.

Irving Z.C., Glasser A.

Montemayor C.

How should we define inferential reasoning in high-level cognition? Can non-conscious representations guide or even determine high-level cognition? If so, what are the properties of such non-conscious representations? Two contemporary debates on high-level cognition center on these issues. The first concerns the possibility of cognitive penetration, or the degree and extent to which high-level cognition influences or determines low-level cognition. The second focuses on the epistemic status of conscious cognition, and on whether or not non-conscious cognition could play a similar, albeit not as fundamental, justificatory role as conscious cognition. This latter issue is at the heart of the question concerning the epistemic status of conscious awareness. This paper focuses on the epistemic standard required for inference, or inferential reasoning, to count as justificatory. The debates on the epistemic status of consciousness and cognitive penetration typically assume such a standard because high-level cognition is associated with rationality, inferentially-structured thought, and the epistemic responsibility one has for the conclusions drawn through one’s inferences. The paper proposes an account of inferential-attention that explains how cognitive penetration of non-phenomenally conscious cognition and perception is possible, and why there are unconscious processes that should be considered as essential components of high-level cognition. Sections 1 and 2 provide a theoretical framework for understanding the multiple criteria that an adequate account of inference and rational thought must satisfy. Sections 3 and 4 articulate the inferential-attention account and explain how it meets the descriptive and normative criteria for epistemic responsibility and rationality. In particular, section 3 defends an agential interpretation of inferential-attention, which offers a resolution of the tension between conservative or consciousness-based approaches to inference and liberal approaches that allow for types of unconscious or subdoxastic processes. The key is to identify this kind of epistemic agency with attention. Section 4 compares this inferential-attention account with an influential agential account of inference based on conscious intuition, and it argues that the former account is preferable. This section also demonstrates the significance of inferential-attention in higher cognition, even when it is non-phenomenally conscious.