At All Costs: How Relative Rebel Strength Affects PGM Sexual Violence in Civil Conflict

Carey S.C., Mitchell N.J., Paula K.

This article presents version 2.0 of the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). It is increasingly clear that it is untenable to assume a unified security sector, as states often rely on militias to carry out security tasks. The PGMD 2.0 provides new opportunities for studying questions such as when states rely on militias, how they chose among different types and the consequences for stability and peace. We detail how the PGMD 2.0 provides new information on the characteristics, behaviour, life cycle and organization of 504 pro-government militias across the globe between 1981 and 2014.

Nordås R., Cohen D.K.

This article reviews the remarkable growth in empirical literature in political science on wartime sexual violence against civilians, including rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, and other forms. Early work, motivated by ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, tended to portray these forms of violence as inevitable, ubiquitous, and either opportunistic or strategic. However, recent literature and new data sources have documented substantial variation in sexual violence across countries, conflicts, perpetrators, and victims and survivors. Building on this observed variation, scholars have developed and tested a wealth of theories about when, where, why, and under what conditions sexual violence occurs as well as its consequences. We highlight the core findings from the literature, explain the key debates among experts, and explore several avenues for future research. We conclude by detailing what the study of wartime sexual violence—both the findings and the research process—offers to a broader set of political science scholars.

Park S., Sim Z.M.

Doctor A.C.

Abstract Do foreign fighters increase the prevalence of rebel-inflicted sexual violence? Evidence from recent armed conflicts indicates that this may be the case. However, little is known regarding the generalizability and nature of this relationship. This article argues that foreign fighters present local insurgencies with both strategic benefits—i.e., a reduced dependency on local civilians for material support—and organizational challenges—i.e., threats to intra-group cohesion. In combination, these factors increase local rebel commanders’ willingness to institute policies and oversee practices of sexual violence. I test this theory with a mixed methods research design. In the first stage, I estimate a series of ordinal logistic regression models with a sample of 143 rebel groups active from 1989 to 2011. In the second stage, I investigate further with a case study of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Together, the results demonstrate that when foreign fighters are present in the rank and file, a rebel group is likely to perpetrate more prevalent levels of sexual violence. In addition to explaining group-level differences in rebel-inflicted sexual violence, this study demonstrates how local rebel commanders adjust their internal management strategies to the presence of foreign recruits.

Revkin M.R., Wood E.J.

Abstract The Islamic State (IS), which controlled significant territory in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017, engaged in a wide repertoire of violence against civilians living in these areas. Despite extensive media coverage and scholarly attention, the determinants of this pattern of violence remain poorly understood. We argue that, contrary to a widespread assumption that the IS wielded violence indiscriminately, it systematically targeted different social groups with distinct forms of violence, including sexual violence. Our theory focuses on ideology, suggesting it is a necessary element of explanations of patterns of violence on the part of many armed actors. Ideologies, to varying extent, prescribe organizational policies that order or authorize particular forms of violence against specific social groups and institutions that regulate the conditions under which they occur. We find support for our theory in the case of sexual violence by IS by triangulating between several types of qualitative data: official documents; social media data generated by individuals in or near IS-controlled areas; interviews with Syrians and Iraqis who have knowledge of the organization's policies including victims of violence and former IS combatants; and secondary sources including local Arabic-language newspapers. Consistent with our theory, we find that the organization adopted ideologically motivated policies that authorized certain forms of sexual violence, including sexual slavery and child marriage. Forms of violence that violated organizational policies but were nonetheless tolerated by many commanders also occurred and we find evidence of two such practices: gang rape of Yazidi women and forced marriage of Sunni Muslim women.

Sarwari M.

Abstract Does rebel group ideology influence variation in wartime sexual violence? While existing studies have explored country-level and conflict-specific factors to explain wartime sexual violence, it is important to recognize that rebels vary in their characteristics and sexual violence behavior. Specifically, rebel groups differ in their values regarding gender equality. I argue that the ideological preferences held by rebels and their foreign supporters can influence sexual violence during armed conflict. Particularly, I make the claim that rebels influenced by a leftist ideology are less likely to commit wartime sexual violence, whereas religious groups, Islamist and non-Islamist, are more likely to perpetrate such violence. Using a statistical analysis to explore the effects of ideology of rebel groups on sexual violence during the period of 1989–2008, I find that leftist rebels commit lower levels of wartime sexual violence. Furthermore, findings reveal that leftist organizations that receive support from leftist third parties are less likely to perpetrate sexual violence. Religious rebels who receive support from conservative supporters, on the other hand, are more likely to commit sexual violence.

Sawyer K., Bond K.D., Cunningham K.G.

A number of explanations have been advanced for why soldiers commit acts of sexual violence in wartime, yet we have little understanding of why some rebels refrain from sexual violence. We examine ...

Whitaker B.E., Walsh J.I., Conrad J.

Sexual violence in wartime is not inevitable, and its prevalence varies substantially among armed groups and over time. This study investigates how the financing of rebel organizations influences t...

Hoover Green A.

Why do some military and rebel groups commit many types of violence, creating an impression of senseless chaos, whereas others carefully control violence against civilians? A classic catch-22 faces the leaders of armed groups. Leaders need large groups of people willing to kill and maim—but to do so only under strict control. How can commanders control violence when fighters who are not under direct supervision experience extraordinary stress, fear, and anger? This book argues that discipline is not enough in wartime. Restraint occurs when fighters know why they are fighting and believe in the cause—that is, when commanders invest in political education. Drawing on evidence about state and non-state groups in El Salvador, and extending the argument to the Mano River wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the book shows that investments in political education can improve human rights outcomes even where rational incentives for restraint are weak—and that groups whose fighters lack a sense of purpose may engage in massive violence even where incentives for restraint are strong. It concludes that high levels of violence against civilians should be considered a “default setting,” not an aberration.

Wood E.J.

When rape by an armed organization occurs frequently, it is often said to be a strategy of war. But some cases of conflict-related rape are better understood as a practice, violence that has not been explicitly adopted as organization policy but is nonetheless tolerated by commanders. The typology of conflict-related rape in this article emphasizes not only vertical relationships between commanders (principals) and combatants (agents) but also the horizontal social interactions among combatants. It analyzes when rape is likely to be prevalent as a practice, emphasizing not only gendered norms and beliefs of the society from which combatants come but also how those might be transformed by the organization’s socialization processes. In the conclusion, I suggest that the typology is relevant for analysts of all forms of of political violence and also for prosecutors, policy advocates, and policymakers concerned with conflict-related rape.

Green A.H.

Ex-combatants who fought with the Salvadoran Army during El Salvador’s 1980–92 civil war often recall being ‘captured’, rather than recruited, suffering beatings and humiliation in the course of training, and fighting without a sense of purpose or direction. Those who served with rebel forces, by contrast, recall fatigue and frustration with new routines, but seldom hazing or abuse; most also recalled deep, ongoing instruction about the purpose and goals of the war. This comparison highlights the broad variation in armed groups’ formal institutions for socialization, a topic that political scientists have only recently begun to examine in depth. The Salvadoran case also emphasizes some shortcomings of the existing literature, which may elide the differing effects of different formal institutions, treat individual institutions as operating independently on combatant behavior, and/or fail to map complex causal processes intervening between institutions and behavior. This article takes as its starting point the observation that many armed group institutions – including recruitment, military training, political training, and disciplinary regimes – are components of the process known more generally as ‘combatant socialization’. Examining specific institutional processes associated with combatant socialization allows for the generation of more refined and specific theories of combatant socialization as both a causal variable and an outcome. At the same time, treating armed group institutions as related elements of a broader process, rather than as fully separate institutions, may also advance understandings of the effects of these institutions. I demonstrate that the implementation and content of formal institutions for socialization varied significantly both across and within groups in El Salvador; building on this analysis, I lay out several potential directions for comparative research.

Johansson K., Sarwari M.

What is the impact of foreign troop support on combatant-perpetrated sexual violence against civilians? We hypothesize that biased troop support increases the risk of sexual violence by the subordinate party both as a consequence of strategic considerations and as a product of a situation increasingly conducive to opportunistic behavior. Time-series cross-section analyses of all civil wars during 1989–2012 are largely supportive of our expectation. Rebel groups are more likely to perpetrate sexual violence the more troop support the state receives. Likewise, state forces are more prone to commit sexual violence the more they are challenged by troops supporting the rebel group(s).

Hoover Green A.

This article proposes a framework for understanding variation in armed groups’ abilities to control wartime violence, including violence against civilians. I argue that patterns (both levels and forms) of violence are shaped by armed group leaders’ attempts to meet two conflicting imperatives. To succeed, commanders must build a fighting force capable of swift, unhesitating violence; they must also maintain some control over the level, form(s), and targeting of violence. I refer to this situation as the Commander’s Dilemma. Drawing on literatures from psychology and sociology, I argue that effective behavioral control cannot be achieved via extrinsic incentives (i.e. pecuniary or non-pecuniary rewards and punishments) alone. Rather, effective control of combatant violence depends upon armed group institutions intended to align combatants’ preferences with those of commanders. I therefore focus analytically on political education, the armed group institution most likely to operate in this way. In particular, I hypothesize that armed groups with strong and consistent institutions for political education should display, on average, narrower repertoires of violence than those without. This argument finds preliminary support in a cross-national analysis of reported rape by rebel forces, as well as a qualitative investigation of armed groups during civil war in El Salvador. More broadly, this approach suggests that the creation of restraint is at least as important to our understandings of wartime violence as the production of violence.

Cohen D.K.

Ash K.

ABSTRACTIt is puzzling why leaders delegate authority to pro-government militias (PGMs) at the expense of professional armed forces. Several state-level explanations, ranging from low state capacity to blame evasion for human rights violations have been proposed for the establishment of PGM linkages. These explanations lack focus on the individuals making decisions to form PGMs: national leaders. It is argued that leaders create linkages with PGMs to facilitate leaders’ political survival in the event of their deposition. Threats to leaders’ survival come from the military, foreign powers, or domestic actors outside the ruling coalition. As costs of leader deposition are low for the state, leaders facing threats from one or all of these sources must invest in protection from outside of the security apparatus. The argument is tested through data on PGM linkage formation and threats to political survival. Results show that leaders under coup threat are more likely to form PGM linkages, while threats from fo...