Philosophical Studies, volume 138, issue 1, pages 17-27

Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

Publication typeJournal Article
Publication date2006-09-21
scimago Q1
SJR1.203
CiteScore2.6
Impact factor1.1
ISSN00318116, 15730883, 05540739
Philosophy
Abstract
In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.
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