Quality of Life Research

The Aristotelian virtue phronesis economically yet comprehensively integrates moral perception with moral action. Though aspects of phronesis characterize many complex skills, we claim that, in the right circumstances, thinking and acting phronetically can facilitate fast and slow moral choices and be involved in the governance of both intuitively guided and intentional moral action. Phronesis , working with values and affordances, reveals the fittingness of potential actions to the moral actor, indicating which action is best. By relating (though not directly equating) aspects of phronesis to components of executive function, we integrate work whose potential relevance for moral psychology has been largely overlooked.

Scientists and engineers in psychoinformatics are developing new ways to capture changes in mental conditions through data generated from people’s interaction with digital devices, especially smartphones. This new approach is called digital phenotyping . It draws on evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins’ notion of the extended phenotype . However, there is surprisingly little biological thinking in the literature on digital phenotyping of the mind. This article pursues an epistemic critique of digital phenotyping of the mind through an ‘infrastructural inversion’ based on a material-discursive reconstruction. It rereads Dawkin’s work on the extended phenotype. It traces the emergence of a correlational psychology and of psychometric instruments used to validate extended digital phenotypes of mind and behaviour. Alternative ontologies of mental health and disorder are presented to challenge the medical model embedded in current international classifications of mental and behavioural diseases. Digital phenotyping of the mind may be in danger of just reproducing an already problematic medical model when the deeper theoretical background assumptions concerning causality and reverse inference are not properly addressed.

This study examines and interprets a significant connection between the life experiences and professional work of Carl Rogers. The focus is on Rogers’ life-long struggle to be “congruent” or “real” in his therapeutic, professional, and personal relationships, a challenge that he never managed to meet fully. In doing so, it illustrates the possible utility of studies of connections between the personal lives of psychologists, the psychological ideas and theories they create, and the sociocultural impact they have.

This article takes the career of Spanish filmmaker Val del Omar (1904–1982) as a basis for analysing some of the crossroads between the psychologisation of modern culture and the development of cinematic art. Like Sergei Eisenstein or Jean Epstein, Val del Omar was an avant-garde director who resorted to psychological discourse to substantiate his aesthetic theories and proposals. As his creative life spanned the better part of the 20th century, he was able to absorb many psychological premises into his theses, including theories around ethno-psychology, psychoanalysis, perception, and empathy. As our analysis shows, those premises drove his aesthetic experimentation to limits beyond conventional cinema. More specifically, Val del Omar’s heterodoxic theoretical and cinematic output focused on two features of psychology he deemed inherent to the new audiovisual media: perceptive automatism and the empathetic connection with the sublime. Building on those grounds, Val del Omar aimed to spur the development of freely willed individuals-viewers. Our conclusions stress the continuity between his psycho-aesthetic agenda and the social engineering characteristic of Western modernity, in conjunction with the construction, not wholly free of contradiction, of the model of subjectivity requisite to that endeavour.

Increasing numbers of people tend to seek relationships with artificial intelligence (AI) because of its comprehensive mastery of knowledge. This research reveals that ChatGPT has become a temporary refuge for individuals encountering real-life emotional crises. The communicative affordance of human–AI conversation is featured by logos-centrism, pursuing the identity of language and essence between humans and technology. Grounded in Lacanian discourse theory, this research argues that the psychological and discursive dynamics behind human–AI dialogue entail a structure of the hysteric’s discourse, which stems from the questioning users fantasizing and interrogating the GPT as a master of knowledge. Also, capitalist discourse is revealed during the repetitive AI companionship that empowers users with the agency of controlling the dialogue and the user’s primordial lack of desire is transformed into a demand that can be resolved through consumption. GPT may become a consumer product of technological capital, while the emotional needs of individuals are commodified within these discursive structures.

In psychology, it is largely assumed that researchers collect real data and analyze them honestly—that is, it is assumed that data fabrication seldom occurs. While data fabrication is a rare phenomenon, estimates suggest that it occurs frequently enough to be a concern. To this end, statistical tools have been created to detect and deter data fabrication. Often, these tools either assess raw data, or assess summary statistical information. However, very few studies have attempted to review these tools, and of those that have, certain tools were excluded. The purpose of the present study was to review a collection of existing statistical tools to detect data fabrication, assess their strengths and limitations, and consider their place in psychological practice. The major strengths of the tools included their comprehensiveness and rigor, while their limitations were in their stringent criteria to run and in that they were impractical to implement.

Written from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy, this article evaluates recent claims that phenomenology has an important contribution to make in redressing the lack of insight into Autistic lived experience. As a philosophical discipline concerned with describing, understanding, and interpreting subjective and intersubjective experience, phenomenology is theoretically well-placed to foreground first-person Autistic perspectives in Autism research. In this article, however, we raise concerns that extant phenomenological Autism research often struggles to break free from conceptual commitments that risk objectifying Autistic being-in-the-world as deficient and dysfunctional. If it is to take seriously the challenges posed by the neurodiversity paradigm, we suggest that phenomenological Autism research must adopt a critical approach that engages the diversity of Autistic lived experience. Informed by this theoretical perspective, we give a number of recommendations for future phenomenologically informed qualitative research of Autistic lived experience that is empathic and inclusive of Autistic ways of being, whilst actively working against the alienation of Autistic people.

This paper posits the existence of two forms of disavowal: cynical and fetishistic. It explores how cynical disavowal involves maintaining a manipulative distance by obscuring the gap between belief and action, allowing the cynic to disavow their investment in an unattainable object and their knowledge of the Other’s lack. In contrast, fetishistic disavowal acknowledges both the objective reality of things and their subjective appearance to the fetishist. Unlike cynicism, fetishism does not rely on obscuring the gap between belief and action; instead, it recognizes and embraces both aspects. In doing so, this paper highlights significant differences between the manipulative distance of the cynic and the self-awareness of the fetishist. It acknowledges the role of cynicism in maintaining the limits and prohibitions within ideology and authority, through examples of banality, while also emphasizing the unique qualities of fetishistic disavowal.

We critically examine the concept of moral outrage within the context of contemporary psychological and moral theory. The prevailing assumption that moral outrage should be a form of disinterested anger—where the individual is uninvolved—presents significant challenges for understanding its moral character. We propose a socioconstructionist approach to moral emotions, arguing that outrage is not inherently disinterested but rather deeply embedded in social norms. By examining moral anger and outrage through this lens, we show that outrage, though often seen as subjective or selfish, can still serve prosocial functions and uphold moral standards. We discuss how norms shape the expression of moral emotions, suggesting that outrage not only responds to norm violations but also plays a role in shaping these norms. We conclude by proposing a more nuanced understanding of moral outrage that integrates personal involvement and normativity to reconcile its subjective nature with its social and moral significance. This approach provides a framework for more robust empirical studies and a deeper understanding of the relationship between emotions, morality, and social norms.

Rapid changes in technology have contributed to making globalization a reality, in spite of it being criticized for imposing Western cultural values on the world. Globalization embeds a neoliberal ideology where productivity, competition, and profit prevail. This paper posits that neoliberalism has enabled the persistence and further spread of coloniality in the field of psychology, both as a research enterprise and practice. The production of psychological research, the diagnosis of psychological disorders, and the prescription of Western therapeutic packages all follow the neoliberal profit-making paradigm which commodifies the field of psychology. The underrepresentation of Global South research is discussed, as well as the over-emphasis on individuality in the conceptualization of well-being and success. The call for a decolonial perspective is underlined, advocating a perspective from within, as opposed to a perspective from above, that critically and selectively integrates indigenous knowledge and practices with what is relevant from the West.

In this paper, we provide a brief survey of the history of the concepts of emotion and emotion regulation and compare two of the leading scales of emotion regulation—the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). Our purpose is to determine where there might be room for improved conceptual clarity in the study of emotion regulation research today. We conclude by suggesting that the conceptual difficulties within and between these scales are symptomatic of a deeper problem in psychological research, that of reductionism, and suggest a nonreductive read of the concepts in question.

In this short editorial, I announce the conclusion of my term as editor of Theory & Psychology. I reflect on the last eight years of the journal, and express my hopes for the future.

The “standard definition” of creativity holds that a creative idea is one that is novel and useful. This judgement is customarily based on an external frame of reference as it is passed by people who are receiving the idea (the recipient). The internal frame of reference of the person who has generated the idea (the creator) is usually ignored. I make two cases in this paper. First, that employing external frames of reference in assessing creative products has been erroneously applied to understand the creative mind. Second, that any definition of creativity needs to be one that can be reasonably applied whether following an internal frame of reference of the creative experience or an external frame of reference of the creative product. With these aims in mind, I propose the following amendment to the definition of creativity: a creative idea is one that is both novel and satisfying.