Korean Journal of Ophthalmology

The article presents the results of the study of discursive construction and moralization of subjectivity in court documents. The research is based on the analysis of court decisions in criminal cases under Article 148 of the Criminal Code, Part 1 and Part 2 (better known as the article ‘on insulting the feelings of believers’), as well as demanding compensation for moral injury for ‘insulting the feelings of believers’ under Article 151 of the Civil Code. The documents create a model of an intersubjective situation of insult, considered with the reliance on the internal states of the participants of this situation — intentions in the case of the accused and emotions in the case of the victims, which are expressed through the legal language. The discursive reconstruction of the intentions of the accused is framed with reference to legal moral categories, this creates an image of a person who consistently and deliberately violates the norms of the moral order. To protect this order, ‘religious feelings’ translated into terms of moral injury and moral suffering. Hence, in the context of the legal protection of the ‘feelings of believers’, the anti‑social behaviour of the accused is contrasted with social, i.e. moral, behaviour, namely, respect for certain (most often Orthodox Christian) symbols. The typical antipode for the accused is a religious person, or, rather, someone who properly demonstrates an emotional reaction to acts of transgression of moral boundaries.

.

.

The article is devoted to the study of the extent to which the fiction can have predictive potential in describing the religious life of the modern era and, in particular, the figure of the Orthodox priest in the Russian Empire. The focus is on the epistolary novel by Alexander Sturdza “Letters on the Offices of Holy Orders” (1840– 1841). The priest depicted by Sturdza must meet the requirements of modernity, be a “priest of the 19th century.” Moving away from the situation of estate‑based social structure, Sturdza depicts a priest who overcomes all cultural and social differences, excludes himself from the market interactions and triggers gift economy and early religious socialization of the children. All this allows him to “become the conscience of the Christians,” regardless of the social barriers separating them. The priest himself, in turn, cannot be imagined without a confessor, who allows him to withstand the stress of intense relationships in modern society. The priest image in Sturdza’s novel is significantly ahead of his time: many changes can be found in both normative narratives about the Orthodox priesthood and the social processes in Russian society. In this sense, we can say that the author’s “imagination” in this case was an artistic development of his historical anticipations that allowed him to predict the further course of development of the Russian religious life.

The author tests the cultural hypothesis of the evolutionary theory of modernization by R. Inglehart and K. Welzel using the cases of Muslim regions of Russia (North Caucasus and Volga region). Based on survey data from online communities, the author demonstrates that the classic idea of the theory about greater secularization in richer regions also works for Russian Muslim‑majority regions. Tatarstan and Bashkiria turn out to be less religious both in terms of subjective religiosity (self‑identification and the importance of God in life) and objective religiosity (fasting, frequency of prayers and visiting mosques), while the regions of the North Caucasus (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachay‑Cherkessia) show the opposite trend. Moreover, the subjective religiosity of respondents turns out to be much higher than the objective religiosity. At the same time, the index of objective religiosity turns out to be a suitable instrument for measuring religiosity in Muslim societies, explaining up to half of the variation in subjective religiosity. The social class of the respondents (income, age and education), the share of the Russian population and ethnic homogeneity, as well as the economic situation of the region, are also correlated with religiosity, which once again confirms the hypothesis of the above theory.

The article examines the contemporary art exhibitions in twenty‑first‑century Russia that sparked accusations of “blasphemy” and extensive public debate and prompted law enforcement interventions. In the first part of the article, I retrospectively illustrate the history of the most prominent “blasphemous” contemporary art exhibitions in Russia, leading to the application of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code against the artists. These incidents, which followed the “Pussy Riot” case, resulted in the amendments to the Criminal Code that tightened the penalties for offending religious sentiments. Consequently, religious and radical nationalist movements were empowered to approach law enforcement agencies to initiate investigations and hold artists and activists accountable. In the second part of the article, I delve into two exhibitions held in one of the most conservative Russian state art museums, the State Hermitage Museum. These exhibitions are the 2012 Chapman Brothers’ “The End of Fun” and the 2016 “Jan Fabre: Knight of Despair — Warrior of Beauty.” Employing the concept proposed by the Dutch anthropologist Jojada Verrips, I aim to explore how the critics of the exhibitions conceptualized their outrage and offended sensibilities. Additionally, I analyze how various stakeholders, including Hermitage staff, Orthodox believers, and the prosecution, contested and justified the “blasphemous” nature of the exhibitions.

The article examines modern discourses about miracles to show how the discourses legitimize the sacred, i.e., justify its presence in the picture of the world. These discourses contain narratives about miracles as having a normative character: there are stories about proper and improper actions in contact with a miraculous object and about negative or positive results, desirable or undesirable transformations in the life of someone who had such contact. The article analyzes institutional religious discourses of the Russian Orthodox Church in comparison with modern vernacular discourses. The institutional religious discourses use narratives about miracles to form and maintain confessional norms and ideas, and they view negatively the vernacular forms with its emphasis on magical use of the sacred. At the same time, the article argues that the vernacular religious discourses generate miraculous plots, including those that ensure the reproduction of confessional norms and ideas.

The article deals with a pattern of Soviet civil rituals of the 1960s where a soldier killed at the WWII was “given” a personal voice to address the living. In an atheist state, listening to the voices of the dead should not have been a conventional metaphor; however, the organizers of these ritual performances took what was happening as seriously as possible. The article focuses upon the story of three such “letters to the future” written for the so‑called “time capsule” in 1967. These letters were created by members of the Novorossiysk teenage club “Schooner of Peers” on behalf of the teenagers who volunteered for the WWII and died there. These letters offer a frame of communication between the deceased teenagers of the 1940s and the yet‑to‑be‑born teenagers of the 2010s. The paper considers the case as an example of Soviet ritualized speech. Drawing on Erwing Goffman’s theory of “social voice”, the article places the practices of speaking on behalf of the dead in the broader context of late Soviet state‑building practices that used the figures of dead young volunteers to promote the concept of the “unpaid debt of the living to the dead.”

.

The authors focus on how faith‑based groups, either affiliated with the Church, or those whose connection to Orthodoxy may be uncertain, provide patriotic education primarily through paramilitary activities and instruction in martial arts (sports). The article seeks to answer the question: why faith‑based groups are increasingly interested in military‑ patriotic education and why this education is predominantly implemented through activities like sports and martial arts. The authors posit that patriotic activity serves not only as a means of obtaining financial support, but also as a way to legitimize the existence of groups that may be in conflict with the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Patriotic education also reflects faith‑based groups’ intention to return to the ritualistic origins of sport and other physical practices, presenting them as a form of worldly asceticism. The article is based on a close‑up study of the former Pokrov Fraternity (Perm), the Center “Spas” (Obninsk), and the all‑Russian movement “Sorok Sorokov”, not being limited to them.

The article analyzes the evolution of the «sacred corner» and its structure in the Russian peasant tradition from the point of view of vernacular functions that it performed in the peasant house of the 19th — early 21st centuries. The work was carried out at the intersection of ethno‑linguistic, ethnographic and cultural methods. The material for the work comes from field research of the last two decades in the Lower Volga region and in the northwestern regions of Russia as well as ethnographic data of the 19th–20th centuries. The evidences of foreigners who visited Russia in the 16th–18th centuries are used to understand the history of а sacred corner formation. A pragmatic analysis of the available data makes it possible to consider the sacred corner (in the form in which it has been known since the 19th century) as a complexly structured locus of a peasant dwelling. The sacred corner performed broader mental and information functions besides the sacral one. The sacred corner was a symbolic center that reflected the intellectual interests and the worlview of the house owner. The sacred corder retained and expanded the status of an information and communicative center in the 20th century in spite of atheistic persecution it now included both a radio or TV sets as well as the most important information, from psalms and the Bible to medical prescriptions and notes with ritual spells.

Contemporary sociology of religion interprets the weak religiosity of the Orthodox Christians in Russia either as a “nominal” membership in Orthodox Church, or as a particular stage on a linear path to full churching. Both views oversimplify rich religious experience. The boundaries between the main oppositions (sacred‑profane, religious‑secular), on which the sociology of religion was based, are no longer obvious in the modern world. We are trying to discover new themes and analyze the contribution of both traditional church piety and new values of self‑realization, environmental friendliness, body, etc. The analysis is carried out within the framework of Q‑methodology: 30 respondents, analysis of prototypes of religiosity based on Q‑sorts of a set of 136 cards and in‑depth interviews. The “Weak Religiosity” Q‑set was developed based on the ideas of T. Luckmann’s “Invisible Religion” and represents 8 spheres. Each sphere is actualized through a set of statements that describe potential experiences of the transcendent at different levels or indicate the importance of this experience. Statements (136 in total) are formulated in the third person. The paper describes eight prototypes: 1) “classical” religiosity, 2) civic and political engagement, 3) relationships with other people, 4) spirituality, 5) body and a healthy lifestyle, 6) creativity and personal self‑realization, 7) self‑development and the common good, 8) work. We argue that these prototypes can be interpreted as specifically religious, irreducible to any non‑religious factor. 

The article describes two religious ritual practices widespread in the Catholic‑ Orthodox borderland and formed under the influence of (para)liturgical practices as a kind of “replica” of them. The use by the rural community of a cross similar to the cross carried during processions and funerals probably began during the Soviet period, when church funeral processions were banned and then the churches were closed. These crosses, made by locals, are kept in the homes of those revered as religious leaders and belong to the entire village community. When someone dies in the village, this cross is taken to the house of the deceased and then it is carried with the coffin to the cemetery. Another rite called the Rite of the Candle is the veneration of an icon or a special candle belonging to whole village community. On a certain Christian holiday, the “Candle” is carried from the house where it has been located during the year to another where it will be located through the next year. The rite was apparently formed at the time of the spread of the Union of Brest and on the territory where it was in force. In Soviet times, this rite, which retained its main features, has been considered by local residents as a substitute of church services. The rite reflects liturgical and paraliturgical practices that are widespread: the proskomidia, the consecration of bread, wine and oil, the collection and use of material evidence of piety, and the passing under the shrine. The very moment of carrying the “Candle” from house to house resembles a procession. At the same time, in the attitude to the place of the Candle’s stay we can see the construction of a sacred space replacing inaccessible temples: as long as the “Candle” is in the house, this house is open to any visitor at any time. Any person, even those who do not know the owners, can come there, pray, light a candle, ask for help. Both the cross and the icon or candle are regarded as common property, not belonging to anyone in particular, but representing an undoubted sacred object with which the rural community associates itself. At present, rituals are being reborn and adapted to new conditions.

The paper focuses on the semiotic ideologies that define the ways of designating old things and the practice of interacting with them in the post‑Soviet countries. Soviet icons, the most common religious artifacts of the Communist era, also passed into the category of “old things” after the collapse of the USSR. Their functions, loci of existence and symbolic status changed when the Soviet state ceased to exist. The assessments and practices of handling icons of the Soviet years are influenced by five semiotic ideologies that the authors identify and which are generally characteristic of modern Russian society: historical, antique, family, modernizing and the ideology of the “dangerous thing”. They all acquire another dimension when complemented by the idea of virtue, typical for the religious field. Each of these attitudes has developed in its own socio‑cultural environment and under the influence of various historical processes. In modern society, they are in constant interaction, sometimes entering into confrontation: they compete in the minds of “moderaters” (icon owners, prists, etc.), “shine through” each other, change depending on the communicative situation. The one that will prevail over the others will ultimately determine whether the moderator chooses the practice of preserving Soviet icons or will dispose of them. In the final part of the article, the authors analyze the influence that researchers (historians, anthropologists) can have on “moderators”, communicating with them during expeditions and voluntarily or involuntarily provoking them to changing/switching between semiotic ideolgies.

The article deals with the practices of venerating icons among Old Believers in the context of anti‑religious policy in the USSR and their transformation after the end of religious persecution. The data comes from ethnographic observations and memories recorded from 2008 to 2023 among the Old Believers of the North‑Western Black Sea region as well as migrants from this region to other parts of Russia. Since the narrativization of personal experience occurs with the support of material objects, ethno‑confessional symbols play an important role in autobiographical memories of manifesting everyday religiosity. The article shows the role of icons in the perception of religious experience, transmitting ideas about one’s faith as well as rules of interaction with an icon in different contexts. During anti‑religious campaigns, the veneration of icons was transferred to a safe space hidden from the external environment, and the most significant thing for a believer, judging by the interview materials, was the very fact of the presence of the sacred objects in the home space. After the end of religious persecutions, new rules were formulated that allow for a freer arrangement of icons in the house, with less rigid regulating rules. Still there are prohibitions on placing a bed under the icon, or placing a mirror or mobile phones next to it, or placing a TV set at the sacred corner / under the icon / opposite the icon, etc. An important function of home icons is to preserve memory about the past. The choice of the most revered images is determined by events significant for family history, often associated with overcoming a difficult past, which is clearly manifested in the tradition of “serving a holiday” / “taking a holiday into the house,” thus establishing a votive holiday, which is then passed on from generation to generation.