Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Abstract Trope metaphysics tries to explain the world and its features in terms of tropes. Tropes as properties are particulars where as properties, universals are multiply-realizable. The theory of tropes has rejected the existence of Universals. The central claim of this paper is that the trope theory offers comparatively a better metaphysical explanation of the world of everyday experiences than the theory of the Universals. This paper argues that trope metaphysics is better in the sense that (a) it is qualitatively more parsimonious, and (b) its account of the world and its properties is more comprehensive than what the theory of universals offers.

Abstract In this paper, I shall discuss the question whether a concrete object can be multi-located while it is moving or not. I shall say nothing on the vexed issue of multi-location in and for itself. Instead, my discussion will support a ‘might’-conditional claim: ‘if multi-location were possible, then change might imply multi-location’. To do this, after a very short clarification of the various meanings of ‘to be located’, I will first present and discuss Diodorus’ arguments against the reality of motion, since they focus on the question of what the location of the moving item is, and then scrutinize Hegel’s reply to Diodorus’ reasonings, insofar as his answer consists in claiming that an object in motion is in many locations at once. This paper aims to explore the various metaphysical possibilities concerning the logic of location underlying change.

Abstract You and I are conscious. But You-and-I, a pair of subjects, cannot be conscious. Why? Because subjects of consciousness cannot have parts but are mereologically simple. Although most contemporary philosophers do not take the thesis that we are simple seriously, David Barnett has proffered an argument in its defense that has faced numerous objections but is yet to be defeated, or so I will argue. In responding to these objections, I expand and develop important ontological and mereological theses that strengthen Barnett’s argument and others of its kind. I also argue that a significant body of empirical work supports Barnett’s argument against a recent objection. Lastly, I show how, although not made explicit by Barnett, his argument is plausibly a defense of the immaterial self or a bodily soul.

Abstract Here I present an analysis of what it is for an x and a y to be the same F. Unlike the Fregean Analysis (FRE), according to which ‘x is the same F as y’ is equivalent to ‘x is an F, y is an F, and x = y’, the analysis presented and defended here allows that there are possible cases in which x and y are the same F 1 but not the same F 2 even though x is an F 2 and y is an F 2 . The analysis offered here, FRE+, retains the conditions that FRE deems are necessary for being the same F while adding a further condition to allow that the same F 1 can be a different F 2 . Although FRE+ is compatible with there being such cases, FRE+ shares with FRE that the identity mentioned in the analysis is nothing other than absolute identity. Thus, FRE+ offers a way to allow that the same F 1 can be a different F 2 while avoiding conflict with the traditionally accepted logic of identity, and I argue without conflict with the Indiscernibility of Identicals in particular.

Abstract In the literature on the Incarnation, Christ’s human nature is typically understood through the dualist view of human persons. Some dualists hold that the Son becomes human by acquiring a particular body-soul composite. According to them, the Incarnation involves two souls – one divine and one human. On the other hand, other dualists argue that Christ’s human nature is not a concrete particular but a set of properties necessary for being human. These dualists say that the Son, in becoming incarnate, becomes a compound of body and soul, which means there is only one soul present in the Incarnation. However, I contend that these dualist accounts of the Incarnation lead to the absurd multiplication of thinkers. If Christ is not divided or separated into two thinkers, dualists should deny that the Son takes on a soul as a part or becomes a compound of body and soul.

Abstract Aquinas’s analyses of the action process can be traced to a twofold structure: an end as a final cause determines a human action, while the action derives causally from the rational will. By comparing the transcendent relationship between God and His creatures with the special causal and noncausal relationships between human beings and his actions, this paper aims to provide a new perspective for understanding this structure. According to Aquinas, God is the ultimate end and the first agent for all creatures in a state of absolute transcendence. In contrast, human action partially participates in the divine mode of action so that a universal good as an end of action is still transcendentally related to individual actions while the rational will, as a second agent, causally and nontranscendentally contributes to the execution of action. Thus, Aquinas’s action theory is both explanatory and causal.

Abstract Some properties come necessarily clustered. Something, a clustering device, must necessarily keep them clustered. Compresence is one candidate, and it is unclear how to understand it. I discern two aspects of it: compresence as simultaneity and compresence as co-location. Then I clarify certain issues over it, particularly regarding whether or not it is transitive and whether or not it figures in the bundle. Contrary to popular belief, I argue that compresence, under the two-aspectual reading, is transitive and constitutive of the bundle.

Abstract In this paper I object some of the criticisms Wahlberg (2017. “Meso-Level Objects, Powers, and Simultaneous Causation.” Metaphysica 18 (1): 107–25) wages against Mumford and Anjum's (2011. Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press) account of simultaneous causation. A brief outlook on Wahlberg’s argument in favour of sequential causation is introduced. A first objection is presented and it is shown that sequential causation cannot deal with one of Mumford and Anjum’s argument: the possibility of prevention. When sequential and simultaneous causation are put side by side and how the causal process in each of them interact with a subtractive preventer is analysed, sequential causation becomes visibly flawed while simultaneous causation accommodates the prevention. Then, a second objection argues that the solution Wahlberg puts forward is defective and the time intervals marking the beginning of the cause or effect merely change where the problem appears. Finally, I retort a series of concerns Wahlberg stresses about the structure of simultaneous causation: temporal directedness, causal configuration and non-negligible change and time.

Abstract Free will is an intuitive reality that all humans apprehend in their actions. Moral responsibility also stems from this freedom of will. This article first explains that the strong human intuition about free will cannot be dismissed as an illusion. It then examines the notion that a physical being cannot possess free will because it implies the ability to both perform and abstain from an action. In the physical world, all human actions are determined by preceding causes, leaving no room to avoid an action volitionally. Building on this, the article concludes that free will becomes plausible only when rooted in the existence of the soul. Consequently, free will serves as independent evidence for the existence of an immaterial soul.

Abstract Metaphysical nihilism can be defined as the view that there might be no con-crete objects. One may argue for this view defining a finite procedure of sub-traction on a set of concrete, contingent objects juxtaposed across possible worlds, which procedure will eventually terminate in an empty possible world. Obviously, this subtraction argument is not applicable if all non-empty possible worlds contain an infinite number of objects. In this paper, I will discuss in detail the limitations of this argument and then investigate whether and how they can be relaxed.

Abstract There is a strong secular consensus that death terminates subjective consciousness. In this paper I show that this consensus can be meaningfully doubted for entirely secular reasons. After formulating the strongest possible argument which supports this consensus, I argue that it inconsistently excludes Constitutive Russellian Panpsychism (CRP) from consideration. CRP, I maintain, is fully consistent with the possibility of post-thanatological consciousness. To flesh out this account, I develop an account of the Panpsychist Self (PS) that can be axiomatically derived from CRP. I then show that the PS has the right metaphysical structure to ensure that the persistence of consciousness beyond brain death aligns with the persistence of our individual selves.

Abstract Kim’s Ontological Physicalism (OP) presents itself as a naturalistic and monistic metaphysical framework, aligned with the causal closure of the universe and rejecting causally efficacious “exotic” properties. The foundational ontology is, in turn, monistic and materialistic, positing that the universe is composed solely of material particulars: bits of matter. In this work, we identify a notable tension between OP’s intended model and the one OP specifies. Initially, we show how the theory inevitably becomes entangled with higher-order entities, not just particulars. Kim introduces the Supervenience Argument (SA) to counteract the possibility of higher-order entities being causally efficacious. While SA proves to be a plausible strategy, it is ultimately inadequate: not only SA is a petitio principii against emergence, but it is also unsound and invalid. Therefore, we propose a formal strategy to restore its ontological effectiveness. Unfortunately, at a closer look, even this strategy falls short as it unwarrantedly assumes the logicality and invariance of those equivalence relations (such as identity, similarity, and congruence) which are crucial for specifying the theory’s model as composed of particulars.

Abstract The debate between individualism and generalism (qualitativism) concerns the status of individualistic facts and their relations with qualitative facts. It is argued that a proper definition of individualistic facts should be a modal one, and moreover that it requires the assumption of haecceitism for its adequacy, contrary to the common belief. Consequently, the positions of individualism and generalism are dependent upon the more fundamental stances of haecceitism and anti-haecceitism in the metaphysics of modality de re.

Abstract Although many B-theorists do not think that our perceptual experience provides evidence that time passes, they accept that we at least seem to be aware of time’s passage. Consequently, they accept the burden of explaining away the appearance of passage. This paper discuss three arguments aiming to discharge this burden. The first two arguments allow that there is a distinctive phenomenology of passage, whereas the third argues that the belief in passage phenomenology is the result of a cognitive error. None of the arguments succeeds. The first two rest on assumptions that the A-theorist has reasons to reject, in light of facts about the nature of conscious experience – facts concerning both its basis in physical and functional processes, and facts concerning its representation of duration. The third argument fails to provide a compelling account of the source of our belief in passage phenomenology.