Journal of the National Science Foundation of Sri Lanka

Hunter S.T.

After a few months of waiting and anxiety, I arrived in Geneva in early July. This was my first visit to the city. While living in London, I was too busy to travel in Europe during my holidays; they were spent on studying, writing papers, and preparing for exams. I had taken my mother and my youngest aunt—my favorite—for short trips to Paris, and my cousin, who was studying in Paris, and I visited Italy for a few days. So, Geneva was new to me.

Hunter S.T.

In the US presidential elections of 1992, Bill Clinton, candidate of the Democratic Party, won the presidency. Democrats, who had been out of power since the 1980 defeat of Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan, were elated by his victory. As a politically active Democrat since the Johnson administration, my husband, Robert, was also pleased by Clinton’s victory and so was I.

Hunter S.T.

I was born in the last year of the Second World War, in TabrizTabriz, the capital of Iran’s Azerbaijan Province. At the time, Azerbaijan was Iran’s largest province and was known as Iran’s head, because on the map Iran looks like a cat and Azerbaijan as the cat’s head.

Hunter S.T.

After driving two hundred miles, we finally arrived at our weekend house in Milton, Delaware. It was cold and took a while to get warm. The dogs, Topoli and Ferferi (In Persian, Topoli means “chubby” and Ferferi means “curly.” And they both lived up to their names!), were disoriented and nervous.

Hunter S.T.

Our move to Tehran coincided with a turbulent period in Iran’s history. By the time we arrived in the capital, the Iranian government, headed by Dr. Mohammad MossadeghMossadegh, Mohammad, had in March 1951 nationalized the oil industry, causing a crisis in Tehran’s relations with Britain.

Hunter S.T.

I left CSIS in early July 2005 and started work at Georgetown University in September. Like many other episodes in my career, before I could settle into my work I went through a brief period of anxiety. For a few days, I feared that the arrangement with the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding might unravel.

Hunter S.T.

Returning to the ministry in mid-July 1971 after nearly five years felt quite strange. There were new people that I had not met and now had to work with, and I had to become familiar with the characteristics and style of a new boss. As always, I tried hard to adapt to my new circumstances and hoped for the best.

Hunter S.T.

When I look back at my life’s journey, I realize that my happiest days were those of my early childhood, when my mother and I lived in her parental home with my grandmother, uncle, and the youngest aunt.

Hunter S.T.

Understanding any country and making assumptions about its future development require sufficient knowledge of its historical evolution and those factors which have shaped its political, social, and cultural characteristics.

Hunter S.T.

Finally, all the examinations, waiting, and anxiety were over and in the fall of 1965 I started my diplomatic career.

Hunter S.T.

The 1979 Revolution in Iran completely changed the trajectory of my life and career. In the following years, Iran-related issues, particularly the Iran–Iraq war, political infighting in Iran, divisions within the Iranian diaspora, and most importantly, despite periodic hopes for improvement, the steady deterioration of US-Iran relations cast a dark shadow overall aspects of my life.

Hunter S.T.

Against all odds and although I had not prepared for it, I passed the competitive entrance examination and was accepted to Teheran University’s Faculty of Law, Political, and Economic Sciences.

Hunter S.T.

I arrived a few days before Christmas 1978 in Washington D.C. There, I stayed with my former professor and close friend, Robert. By that time, he was working in the administration of President Jimmy Carter as a member of the National Security Council under Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Adviser.

Khan S.

This chapter serves as a platform for the study by introducing the theoretical framework. It incorporates the theory of integration to demonstrate its relevance in understanding cooperation between enduring rivals, particularly in the context of protracted conflicts. The focus of the chapter is to highlight the conditions under which states involved in protracted conflicts can cooperate, specifically on high-stakes issues such as proliferation. It emphasizes that the most challenging aspect of cooperation lies in bringing states to the negotiating table. States engage in rational cost–benefit calculations before committing to any cooperative arrangement. This process can be time-consuming as enduring rivals inherently lack trust and face difficulties in persuading their domestic constituents about the prospects of cooperation. Moreover, leaders tend to be skeptical of sudden shifts in behavior from their belligerent counterparts. However, once a cooperative endeavor, such as the Iran nuclear deal, is initiated, the primary task for the involved actors is to remain loyal to the agreed-upon rules. Defection is to be avoided at all costs for a cooperative arrangement to succeed. Adherence to the rules fosters the development of trust, which is gradually consolidated over time. Building confidence is a process that may require patience, but is achievable if states uphold the norms of the arrangement and refrain from cheating. Trust becomes the bedrock of cooperation, leading to the consolidation of the arrangement. As trust grows, cooperation becomes habitual for the states involved, and they may pursue additional cooperative arrangements on various levels, including trade, transactions, communication, and cultural exchange. In essence, cooperation breeds further cooperation. Optimism in the relationship and patience are important during this period. Positive spill-over effects of cooperation become evident and eventually become institutionalized. Under such circumstances, the conflict between the protracted conflict states has the potential to be transformed to a new level. This positive transformation paves the way for the resolution of the conflict. The chapter highlights the potential for conflict transformation and the prospects of resolving protracted conflicts when cooperation becomes ingrained in the relationship. To recap, this chapter lays the groundwork for the study by introducing the general theoretical framework of integration. It emphasizes the importance of trust, loyalty to the agreed-upon rules, and the gradual consolidation of cooperation over time. The chapter outlines the transformative power of cooperation and its potential to resolve protracted conflicts.

Khan S.

Based on the findings, it is concluded that the case study of Iran confirms the propositions of the theoretical framework. This indicates that the theory is applicable and relevant to understanding the dynamics of the Iran nuclear deal and the potential for cooperation in protracted conflicts. The theory regarding the breakdown of the JCPOA and its implications for international non-proliferation efforts are applicable to the current Iranian nuclear ambitions. The conclusion also provides policy implications of the study. It suggests that the findings of the study have implications for US foreign and security policies and calls for specific policy recommendations in relation to Iran. It emphasizes the need for the United States to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal to prevent Tehran from developing and using nuclear weapons. It highlights that the breakdown of the JCPOA would erode the global non-proliferation framework, raise doubts about diplomacy's effectiveness, reduce trust among treaty signatories, and hinder future nuclear negotiations. The deal's collapse could also result in the loss of vital monitoring mechanisms, making it harder to oversee Iran's nuclear activities. Additionally, it may disrupt regional alliances, causing countries like European powers and Russia to adjust their positions, potentially complicating efforts to address regional conflicts and security concerns. Furthermore, it emphasizes that informal and short-term agreements differ significantly from the JCPOA, underscoring the need to acknowledge the JCPOA’s unique importance in the context of nuclear nonproliferation. Overall, the JCPOA’s failure and deteriorating US-Iran relations could have significant and far-reaching implications for regional stability and nuclear proliferation prevention in the Middle East. Additionally, the breakdown of the JCPOA could prolong the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States.