Antibiotics

ABSTRACT Do we owe anything to our genetic relatives qua genetic relatives? The philosophical literature has primarily addressed this question in the context of procreation. But genetic matching databases raise the question of whether we owe anything to previously unknown genetic relatives. This article argues that influential philosophical arguments regarding moral claims to know one’s genetic origins (sometimes referred to as a ‘right to know’) in the context of gamete donation have implications for a broader set of claims. First, these arguments imply more than a claim to know the identity of a genetic relative; the interests which they invoke can only be satisfied through a relationship. Second, the scope of the claims is broader than tends to be acknowledged: even if procreators have special obligations towards their offspring, these arguments imply that weighty moral claims can be made against other genetic relatives in many different contexts.

Abstract It has been proposed by several scholars that Hegel’s political philosophy can be utilized as a foundation for welfare theory. This article argues that to comprehend the principles, objectives, and limitations of a Hegelian welfare state, we need an account of the theory of justice underlying his political philosophy. This requires an analysis of how Hegel conceptualizes and assesses different kinds of inequality. This article identifies the three kinds of natural, societal, and market inequality and elucidates their interaction and transformation. An examination of the inner workings of the market through the lens of Hegel’s economic theory reveals how these inequalities impede citizens’ freedom. For a Hegelian theory of justice, inequalities pose a problem to the extent that they impede the citizens’ possibility of self-actualization. Consequently, the objective of a Hegelian welfare state is not to actualize an abstract notion of justice, but rather to ensure this possibility of self-actualization.

ABSTRACT The ad hominem appears to be the simplest fallacy form—one criticizes speakers instead of their statements or arguments. It is regularly taken to be a fallacy of irrelevance, in that who is speaking does not bear on the truth of what is said. But three puzzles attend this analysis. (1) Given that the fallacy is simple and seemingly obvious, how could it be effective in practice? (2) Are there not cases when who is speaking is relevant? How do we sort those cases from those where it is irrelevant? (3) Isn’t there another level to the ad hominem, one where we observe it, know it is a bad argumentative move, and make inferences about the argumentative circumstances and arguers in light of it? Accusing another of committing the ad hominem, on this line of thought, has broader implications about the reasoner and their reasons. This article is an attempt to tell a coherent story of the ad hominem that makes sense of these three puzzles and shows how the observed preponderance of the argument form should trouble us as reasoners.

ABSTRACT Some metaphysically interesting notions fall outside of the realm of the mind-independent, and as such will erroneously be considered unworthy of our attention by any view that thinks only of realist metaphysics as substantive (Taylor, 2023). In this article I propose two ways of conceiving of substantive metaphysics that includes some mind-dependent phenomena. The first is to understand substantivity in terms of carving at the joints, but to take where the ‘joints’ are to depend in part on our own interests, preferences, and conceptual schemes (the joints are ours, not nature’s). The second is to think of ‘reality’ as a system of explanatory dependence that includes some suitably embedded mind-dependent phenomena, and thus to deny (if we continue to characterize realism in terms of mind-independence) that we should be realists about all of ‘reality’.

ABSTRACT The starting point for this article is Holton’s (2017) claim that there are no anti-factive attitude verbs (in Indo-European languages). In a first step, I argue that the German verb “wähnen” (as used by Frege and his contemporaries) is a counter-example. However, it seems as though anti-factives are rarer than factives, which raises the question of how to account for that observation. Since Holton’s explanation, as well as a seemingly promising neo-Gricean explanation, turns out to be unsuccessful, I turn to the question of whether the rarity of anti-factives needs to be explained in the first place. I argue that, on closer inspection, anti-factives are not as special as they may appear, and I also argue that the comparative rarity of anti-factives can be explained via the principle of charity.

ABSTRACT This article examines Bolzano’s aesthetic cognitivism. It argues that, while reminiscent of German rationalist aesthetics and hence potentially appearing rigid and outdated, Bolzano’s version of cognitivism is, in fact, highly innovative and more flexible than the cognitivism championed by the rationalists. He imports from the rationalists the idea that aesthetic appreciation and creation are rule-governed, yet does not construe rule-following and engaging in free aesthetic activities as mutually exclusive. Furthermore, thanks to his nuanced treatment of the interaction between aesthetic values and other types of values, Bolzano’s aesthetic cognitivism presents a fresh alternative to contemporary versions of aesthetic cognitivism.

Abstract Metaphysical rationalism is the view that, necessarily, every fact that stands in need of a metaphysical (grounding) explanation has one. Varieties of metaphysical rationalism include classical theism, Spinozism, spacetime priority monism, and axiarchism. Grounding indeterminism is the view that the same ground, in precisely the same circumstances, might not have grounded what it in fact grounds. I argue that a plausible defense of any form of metaphysical rationalism requires a commitment to grounding indeterminism.

ABSTRACT Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and speech of a deceased loved one. If you start having regular interactions with this “thanabot,” could this new relationship be a continuation of the relationship you had with your loved one? And could a relationship with a thanabot preserve or replicate the value of a close human relationship? To the first question, we argue that a relationship with a thanabot cannot be a true continuation of your relationship with a deceased loved one, though it might support one’s continuing bonds with the dead. To the second question, we argue that, in and of themselves, relationships with thanabots cannot benefit us as much as rewarding and healthy intimate relationships with other humans, though we explain why it is difficult to make reliable comparative generalizations about the instrumental value of these relationships.

ABSTRACT Readers should be aware that content about Kant’s racism may be difficult and distressing to read. In various texts, Kant makes statements alleging that Indigenous Americans have ‘no culture’ and Black people possess only the ‘culture of slaves’. These are straightforwardly repugnant commitments. In order to address the role of Kant’s account of ‘culture’ in his racism and provide additional support to Charles Mills’ ‘Untermensch (subhuman) interpretation’ of Kant’s views on race, this article situates Kant’s comments on ‘racialized cultures’ within his teleological account of human history. In his system, ‘culture’ refers to the possession of developed capacities to achieve the ends that one sets for oneself. He sees achievement of culture as part of the development of human beings into members of a socialized, moral kingdom. Given his understanding of culture, I argue that Kant’s remarks on the cultural limitations of persons of color commit him to the further claims that Indigenous Americans and Black people are incapable of setting their own ends and that these deficiencies are hereditary and permanent. For Kant, this has the consequence that these individuals do not possess genuine moral worth in his system, thus supporting Mills’ Untermensch interpretation of Kant’s views on race.

ABSTRACT While philosophers have highlighted important reasons to resist one’s own oppression, they tend to overlook the phenomenon of complacency about one’s own oppression. This article addresses this gap by arguing that some oppressed agents are obligated to resist complacency about their own oppression because failing to do so would significantly harm themselves and others. Complacent members of oppressed groups fail to resist meaningfully, are self-satisfied, and are epistemically culpable. I contend that focusing on the obligation to combat complacency is useful for at least two reasons. First, complacency about one’s own oppression is a distinctive phenomenon that warrants separate philosophical attention. Second, focusing on the obligation to resist complacency helps analyze an undertheorized group of oppressed agents by challenging the binary understanding of power prevalent in the literature on the duty to resist, thereby sharpening philosophical accounts of resistance and filling a gap in a prominent well-being-based theory of resistance.

ABSTRACT In the middle of the 20th century, it was a common Wittgenstein-inspired idea in philosophy that languages are analogous to games and for a linguistic expression to have a meaning in a language is for it to be governed by a rule of use. However, due to the influence of David Lewis’s work it is now standard to understand meaningfulness in terms of conventional regularities in use instead (Lewis 1969, 1975). In this paper I will present a simplified Lewis-inspired Conventions view which embodies the basic idea and argue that it is inferior to the older Rules view. Every theory of meaningfulness in a language must yield a plausible story of what it is to speak the language, that is, of what it is to use an expression with its meaning. Those who have adopted something like the Conventions view standardly take use with meaning to consist in trying to use the expression in the conventionally regular way (Lewis 1969, Davis 2003, Loar 1981). I argue that this proposal fails since use with meaning is compatible with intentional misuses. In contrast, on the Rules view we can take use with meaning to be analogous to making a move in the game and to consist in using it while the rule is in force for one which is compatible with intentionally breaking it. And nothing structurally analogous can be found on the Conventions view without inflating it into the Rules view, which completes the case against it.

ABSTRACT What’s the good of getting angry with a person? Some would argue that angry emotions like indignation or resentment are intrinsically good when they are an apt response. But many think this answer is not fully satisfactory. An increasing number of philosophers add that accusatory anger has value because of what it communicates to the blamee, and because of its downstream cultivating effects on the blamee. Mediators and conflict resolution strategists share an interest with philosophers in the value of reactive attitudes for interpersonal communication, but prominent thinkers from those fields arrive at rather different verdicts about the effects of accusatory anger. On a more therapeutic approach to interpersonal conflict, angry accusation is commonly understood to obfuscate mutual understanding and to have bad downstream effects on the blamee. Below, I discuss how the compassionate communication approach casts doubt on the purported valuable effects of angry accusation, and I provide empirical support for this worry. I argue that philosophers should reconsider their empirical assumptions about the human psychology of discord, and hypothesize that accusatory anger is unlikely to have the communicative and cultivating effects that it is purported to have. I conclude by highlighting further empirical and ethical questions this hypothesis generates.

ABSTRACT Should you take a pill that gives you all the health benefits of sleep and allows you to stay awake? I argue that you shouldn’t. I propose three reasons why sleeping, conceived of as a socially and culturally embedded human activity, is valuable. First, there is aesthetic value in the rituals that typically precede sleeping; second, there is interpersonal value in the intimacy that stems from sleeping with other people; third, there is ethical value in mere presence and in retreating from consciousness. In order to fully support my argument, I situate it within a conception of goodness that embraces the fragility of the human condition and the limitations stemming from our corporeal nature. I conclude with some practical implications of my view.

ABSTRACT This article argues that our attention is pervasively biased by embodied affects and that we are normatively assessable in light of this. From a contemporary perspective, normative theorizing about attention is a relatively new trend (Siegel 2017: Ch. 9, Irving 2019, Bommarito 2018: Ch. 5). However, Buddhist philosophy has provided us with a well-spring of normatively rich theorizing about attention from its inception. This article will address how norms of attention are dealt with in Buddhaghosa’s (5th-6th CE) claims about how wholesome forms of empathy can go wrong. Through this analysis, I will show that Buddhist philosophers like Buddhaghosa think there is an existential norm of attention, one that commands us not just to pay attention to ourselves and the world properly, but one whereby we are exhorted to attend to ourselves in a way that gradually transforms our cognitive-emotional constitution so that we become liberated from suffering.

ABSTRACT It is common for philosophers to suggest that practical deliberation is normative; deliberation about what to do essentially involves employing normative concepts. This thesis—‘the Normativity Thesis’—is significant because, among other things, it supports the conclusion that normative thought is inescapable for us. In this article, I defend the Normativity Thesis against objections.