Shokuhin eiseigaku zasshi. Journal of the Food Hygienic Society of Japan

Abstract Exegetical scepticism is a strand of scepticism about meaning running through the German Enlightenment. This paper provides the first modern account of its tenets, critics, and proponents, and argues that it shares essential features with modern varieties of meaning-scepticism that have been a preoccupation among philosophers of language since the middle of the twentieth century. I argue that exegetical scepticism is a type of epistemological scepticism first introduced as a philosophical position in a theological debate between August Pfeiffer (1640–1698) and Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705). Under contention, so I argue, was the idea that interpretation is never certain because it is necessarily underdetermined by the evidence. Following the effects of this controversy, I show that exegetical scepticism caused a great deal of unrest in German letters in the eighteenth century and can be seen to contribute to the great proliferation of hermeneutical theories in the Aufklärung, indeed to the very birth of hermeneutics as a standalone discipline. Bringing this type of scepticism to contemporary attention supports a reassessment of issues at the heart of meaning-scepticism and hermeneutics itself, and a reconsideration of the histories of Enlightenment scepticism and hermeneutics.

Abstract I respond to comments from Branden Fitelson, Chad Gonnerman and John Waterman, and Mark Walker. My response to Fitelson concerns how we should understand the notion of “sensitivity” which is central to my account of why we find skeptical premises intuitive. I argue against his recommendation except for a specific type of “loose” skeptical hypothesis. Gonnerman and Waterman push me to say more about the conditions under which we feel or not feel the skeptical pull. I clarify and expand on the theory presented in the book. Finally, Walker presents a new type of skeptical challenge. To deal with this challenge, I distinguish between two types of skeptical hypotheses, a mild and more substantial one. Walker’s skeptical argument concerns mild skepticism. My account is aimed at more substantial accounts. However, I speculate about how we may respond to this challenge.

Abstract I selectively summarize some of the main ideas in my book Why We Doubt, focusing on the elements that are discussed in the replies from commentators. In the book, I investigated our skeptical intuitions which form the basis of the skeptic’s arguments. I argue that these intuitive judgments or inclinations to judge are produced by the deployment of a subconscious heuristic, pbs, which serves us well most of the time but misfires in esoteric cases like those associated with global skepticism. I do this by identifying the rational function of pbs and arguing that when we apply this rational function to global skepticism, it doesn’t yield a skeptical result.

Abstract In this short essay, I will be using my title’s question as a way to explore some of the main themes and most intriguing new ideas in Mark Walker’s Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism: On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views. I will first offer a sketch of Walker’s skeptical-dogmatist view. I will then lay out the “skeptic’s predicament” and explore possible ways of escaping the predicament, viz. longshotting, pseudonymizing, and dialogizing.

Abstract In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views—i.e., he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism—i.e., the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker’s arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those views. In doing so, I argue that suspension of judgment is the default justified doxastic attitude—i.e., the doxastic attitude one is epistemically justified in adopting absent any reason to do otherwise. I also champion Skepticism by offering modified versions of some of Walker’s thought experiments, posing challenges for Skeptical-Dogmatism, and arguing that Skepticism and Skeptical-Dogmatism share some common benefits.

Abstract The third and final part of Bias: A Philosophical Study explores the connections between bias and some of the central topics of epistemology, including knowledge, skepticism, and disagreement. It defends the possibility of biased knowing: biased believers can sometimes know, even when they believe in accordance with their biases, and even if those biases guarantee that they would believe as they do even if the truth were otherwise. It argues that the possibility of biased knowing has significant implications for both philosophical methodology and traditional forms of skepticism. Extended consideration is given to the question of whether those of us who robustly favor our ordinary commonsense views over the possibilities that the skeptic calls to our attention are biased against skepticism in any objectionable sense. Finally, it critically examines our tendency to attribute bias to others in response to interpersonal disagreement and the epistemological significance of “the bias blind spot.”

Abstract In this paper, I clarify and defend some of the central ideas of Bias in response to commentators, with a special focus on the theme of skepticism. In response to Michael Veber, I defend the project of offering a modest as opposed to an ambitious response to the skeptic. In response to Jonathan Matheson, I defend my account of the way in which bias attributions function in contexts of interpersonal disagreement, as well as the claim that an unbiased believer will generally be in a stronger position to resist skeptical pressure from disagreement than a biased believer. In response to Brett Sherman, I clarify the way in which my account of bias accommodates the phenomenon of biased suspension of judgment, and I explore some of the connections between bias, suspension of judgment, and skepticism. In response to Jared Celinker and Nathan Ballantyne, I defend the possibility of emergent biases.

Abstract In this brief commentary, we offer thoughts on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study. We focus on the book’s relevance to the study of cognitive biases, including Kelly’s discussion of naïve realism (in the psychologists’ sense). While we are largely enthusiastic about Kelly’s theorizing, we also provide some pushback against his notion of emergent biases. We hope that psychologists will engage with Kelly’s work and might consider how some philosophical refinements could improve the empirical study of biases.

Abstract Ángel Pinillos’ Why We Doubt offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ Bayesian inspired principle.

Abstract Pinillos’ Why We Doubt presents a powerful critique of such global skeptical assertions as “I don’t know I am not a brain-in-a-vat (biv)” by introducing a cognitive mechanism that is sensitive to error possibilities and a Bayesian rule of rationality that this mechanism is designed to approximate. This multifaceted argument offers a novel counter to global skepticism, contending that our basis for believing such premises is underminable. In this work, we engage with Pinillos’ adoption of Bayesianism, questioning whether the Bayesian principle that he invokes truly does fail to generate the verdict that we don’t we aren’t biv s, contrary to what Pinillos asserts. Furthermore, we argue that Pinillos’ empirical argument is not empirical enough; we need a lot more empirical work if we are going to counter global skepticism and win over neutral bystanders.

Abstract According to Thomas Kelly, traditional skeptical arguments can be conceived in terms of bias. The main aim of this paper is not to challenge Kelly’s conclusions, but rather to draw some interesting consequences from them. Specifically, in addition to cases of biased judgments, which draw the ire of the skeptic, there are also cases of biased suspension of judgment. By examining cases of racially biased suspension of judgment and comparing them to cases of skepticism, I argue that we can help to uncover the mechanism that underlies the skeptic’s accusation of bias. In particular, I aim to show that it is the conclusiveness of one’s evidence, rather than the likelihood of the possibility at issue, that matters to the skeptic.

Abstract In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. (1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian scepticism. (2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth-century forebears and maintained their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. (3) That twentieth-century continental philosophers demonstrate little to no interest in Pyrrhonian scepticism. This raises the question: why does engagement with Pyrrhonism disappear from continental philosophy? The article discusses two hypotheses that might explain this disappearance.